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Introduction and overview 
Since the beginning of  the 1990’s, emigration represents a significant phenomenon in 
Southeast Europe (SEE).
6 Remittances, the money sent home by migrants, are one of the most 
visible consequences of emigration.
7 According to the World Bank (2008), remittances are 
rapidly  increasing  from  $119  billion  in  1997  to  $317  billion  in  2007.  The  proportion  of 
remittances to developing countries is also increasing, from 60% in 1997 ($71 billion) to 75% 
in 2007 ($240 billion). Four East European countries are among the world's main recipients of 
remittances  as  percentage  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP),  namely  Albania,  Armenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova.
8 Even if the question of the impact of remittances on 
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recipient countries growth is still open, remittances represent an important source of external 
financing. They exceed international aid flows and, for some countries, the volume of foreign 
direct investments (Ratha, 2005). 
Despite  their  importance,  few  works  have  been  devoted  to  the  study  of  remittance 
determinants in the SEE context. The aim of this research is to offer an empirical estimate of 
the determinants of remittances on SEE countries at macro and micro-level and to investigate 
their impact on the economic situation of the receiving households. Lastly, this research, in 
line with the recommendations of the international economic institutions, offers an overall 
picture of remittances’ determinants. This picture will allow to understand better their impact 
on  development  and  to  devise  appropriate  economic  policies  to  attract  this  source  of 
financing. 
This  report  contains  two  parts.  The  first  part  is  devoted  to  the  macroeconomics  of 
remittances and the second part to the microeconomics of remittances.  
The  first  part  of  this  report  analyses  the  motives  of  remittances.  We  reconsider  this 
question  to  take  account  of  recent  shifting  patterns  of  migration.  Current  international 
migration differs from past immigrations (Freeman, 2006). Among the most salient factors, 
we observe (i) that traditional immigrant source countries have become immigrant-receiving 
countries and  (ii) that immigration policies of  destination countries are increasingly tilted 
toward the most skilled individuals (Faini, 2007). Thus, between 1990 and 2000, the OECD 
stock of skilled immigrants coming from developing countries increased approximately by a 
factor 2 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). An obvious question is whether this brain drain may 
be compensated by larger remittances of skilled immigrants. 
For this purpose, we have created an original dataset of bilateral remittances between SEE 
countries and their main sending countries. First, we exploit a new and original data set of the 
National  Bank  of  Romania  (NBR).  This  dataset  identifies  Romanian  bilateral  aggregate 
remittances coming from its principal emigration countries. Romania is, for various reasons, a 
relevant recipient country. It represents a new country of emigration, highlighting the recent 
shifting  patterns  of  migration.  Moreover,  Romania  is  attracting  a  growing  amount  of 
remittances,  which  represents  almost  50%  of  FDI  inflows  and  constitutes  an  important 
external source of financing. Using this dataset, we find that the macroeconomic motives of 
remittances  in  Romania  are  in  line  with  the  loan  repayment  hypothesis.  Remittances  are   3
considered  as  implicit  loan  repayments  taken  out  by  emigrants  to  support  migration  and 
education costs. Thus, we find that education and geographic distance positively influence 
remittances. These results imply first that liquidity constraints matter and second that highly 
educated migrants may compensate for the brain drain effect. We also find evidence that 
immigration policies and migrant networks affect remittances.  
Second, to complement this study and check the robustness of our results, we build a 
larger dataset for the purpose of this report. This dataset relies on three different sources: from 
the National Bank of Romania (see above), from the National Bank of Albania and from the 
National  Bank  of  Italy  (more  details  in  the  Appendix  of  Part  1).  Using  this  dataset,  we 
confirm the role of the loan repayment hypothesis. 
The second part of the report identifies the microeconomic motives of remittances and 
their implications for the household recipients. For this issue, we have access to the World 
Bank’s  household  surveys  in  Albania,  so-called  Living  Standards  Measurement  Study 
(LSMS). Albania is a very relevant case, since remittances are a crucial source of income for 
households (Mansoor and Quillin, 2006). We use the longitudinal data  collected over the 
period 2002-2004, which allow us to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual 
level when investigating the determinants of the transfers. An additional feature of the data set 
is that we can construct a matched sample using the 2003 wave, with characteristics on both 
the adult children and their parents living in Albania. Two sets of results emerge from this 
microeconomic study.  
The first set of results concerns the motives of remittances. Our econometric analysis 
draw on random and fixed effects discrete choice models to study both the determinants of 
remittances sent by family members and adult children living abroad and their implications on 
the living standard of the recipients. The main conclusions are as follows. First, the proportion 
of households living in Albania and receiving remittances is large (more than 20%) and these 
transfers are mainly devoted to basic needs. Secondly, transfers are negatively correlated with 
both  the  donor’s  and  the  recipient’s  level  of  education,  which  casts  doubt  on  the  loan 
repayment  model.  At  the  same  time,  many  individual  characteristics  turn  out  to  be 
insignificant in the transfer equation and  remittances do not  really depend on the  current 
situation of the recipient. Finally, transfers from abroad have a positive impact on economic 
indicators  like  satisfaction  with  current  situation,  adequateness  of  food  consumption  and   4
number of affordable expenditures. This finding is robust to the correction of selection either 
on observables or unobservables.  
As shown by simple descriptive statistics on self-reported motives, these different results 
suggest that a mix of altruism and exchange is certainly at hand when explaining the pattern 
of remittances in Albania. On the one hand, altruism is more likely when respondents are in a 
needy position and use the transfers they receive for basic needs and to improve their current 
level of consumption. On the other hand, part of the money transferred to Albania households 
is also invested and sending money to those left behind is a good way for migrants to improve 
their own situation (along with those of their family) in the event of a return.  
The second set of results relates to the role of remittances on income expectations. While 
economic theories assign a central role to income expectations, empirical evidence on this 
issue  remains  rather  scarce,  especially  in  the  context  of  less  developed  countries  where 
household income is usually subject to more uncertainty. We find several interesting results. 
First, expectations on financial situation in Albania are not only affected by the current 
level of income, but also by past changes in income. Secondly, the composition of household 
income  matters.  We  find  that  the  receipt  of  remittances  has  a  positive  influence  on  the 
subjective  appreciation  of  households  about  their  future  financial  situation. Thirdly,  when 
comparing realized changes and income expectations over the same time period, we evidence 
that Albanian households do not have rational expectations. Those whose income has fallen in 
the past have a larger propensity of underestimation, while those whose income has increased 
have  a  larger  propensity  of  overestimation.  Finally,  respondents  receiving  transfers  from 
foreign countries tend to slightly overestimate their future financial situation.  
As they stand, our results have strong macroeconomic implications. From an empirical 
viewpoint, it would be of interest to further analyze the complex interplay between economic 
growth in Albania and the fact that households are on average optimistic about their future 
financial  situation. Also,  the  role  of  remittances  and  their  positive  effects  on  well-being 
deserve further attention. Recipients may for instance be more optimistic about their future 
because migrants will have more skills and abilities when coming back in Albania or because 
remittances  are  invested  in  local  activities  and  will  generate  additional  resources  for  the 
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Part 1. The motives of remittances.  




Funds  that  international  migrants  send  back  to  their  country  of  origin  are  rapidly 
increasing from $101 billion in 1995 to $232 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2006), i.e. more 
that 100% of increase. In contrast, the number of international migrants has risen from 150 to 
200 million people, a one-third increase
9. Even if the question of the impact of remittances on 
recipient countries growth is still open, remittances represent an important source of external 
financing. They exceed international aid flows and, for some countries, the volume of foreign 
direct investments (Ratha, 2005). 
In this first part of the report, we analyze the macroeconomic determinants of international 
remittances. We reconsider this old question
10 first to take account of recent shifting patterns 
of  migration  and  second  to  try  to  discriminate  among  alternative  theories  of  remittances. 
Current international migration differs from past mass migration (Freeman, 2006). Among the 
most salient factors, we observe (i) that traditional immigrant-source countries have become 
immigrant-receiving countries and (ii) that immigration policies are increasingly tilted toward 
the most skilled individuals (Faini, 2007). Thus, between 1990 and 2000, the OECD stock of 
skilled  immigrants  coming  from  developing  countries  raised  approximately  by  a  factor  2 
(Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk, 2007a). An obvious question is whether this brain drain may 
be  compensated  by  larger  remittances  of  skilled  immigrants.  Theory  is  ambiguous  in  its 
prediction of the effect of education on remittances (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). In the 
altruistic model (Becker, 1974; Stark, 1995), the migrant cares about the well-being of family 
members' stayed at home. Education has no effect per se once we control for the higher 
earning  it  allows.  In  the  exchange  theory  (Bernheim,  Shleifer  and  Summers,  1985;  Cox, 
1987), the migrant makes transfers in return for services. Educated immigrants are assumed to 
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10 See for instance Swamy (1981), Straubhaar (1986), Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), El Sakka and McNabb (1999) 
or Vargas-Silva and Huang (2005).  
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have lower propensities to return and remittances are a decreasing function of education. In 
the  family  loan  arrangement  model  (Cox  and  Jimenez,  1992;  Poirine,  1997),  remittances 
mainly consist of implicit loan repayments taken out by emigrants to support the migration 
cost or to achieve a better education. More educated migrants should remit more, even after 
controlling for the positive correlation of income and education. The theoretical ambiguity of 
education and remittances motivates our empirical work. Thus, even if remittances are driven 
by mixed motives, the migrant's education may empirically discriminate among alternative 
theories. 
To reconsider the question of the remittance determinants, we create an original dataset of 
bilateral  remittances  between  Southeast  Europe  (SEE)  countries  and  their  main  sending 
countries.
11 SEE is, for various reasons, a relevant recipient region. It represents a new region 
of  emigration,  highlighting  the  recent  shifting  patterns  of  migration.  Moreover,  SEE  is 
attracting a growing amount of remittances, which constitutes an important external source of 
financing.
12 
Despite  its  aggregated  nature,  the  SEE's  data  set  offers  several  advantages.  First, 
macroeconomic data reflect the underlying microeconomic decisions about remittances and 
avoid a potential shortcoming of survey questionnaires: if asked about the motives behind 
remittances, most responders may not emphasize a strategic motive or a particular familial 
arrangement to pay back an exchange or a loan.
13 Second, such data allow working on the 
bilateral corridors of remittances to understand better their impact on development and to 
devise appropriate attractive policies. Finally, the bilateral breakdown helps to capture the 
effects of dyadic factors on remittances and to implement a new discriminative test. “If one 
admits  that  altruism  is  solvable  in  distance”  (Rapoport  and  Docquier,  2006),  increasing 
distance to family should decrease remittances from remote labor-receiving countries. In the 
other hand, in the loan repayment hypothesis, an increasing geographic distance between the 
labor-receiving and the labor-sending countries may imply a higher migration cost supported 
by the family and in return a higher flow of remittances. Along with the migrant's education, 
                                                            
11 Recent papers, done independently and concurrently to  ours, such as  Lueth and  Ruiz-Arranz (2006) and 
Schiopu and Siegfried (2006), make also efforts to develop and use data sets of bilateral remittances. We review 
their contribution in section 3. 
12 For instance, the amount of remittances received by Romania, between 1995 and 2005, was multiplied by 
approximately 15, according to the World Bank. 
13 Poirine (1997) mentions that “it is likely that [remitters] would seldom admit openly to acting in […] a 
calculating manner”.  
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the  bilateral  geographic  distance  may  help  to  discriminate  among  alternative  theories  of 
remittances. 
This part makes several contributions to the existing literature. We find, in line with the 
loan repayment hypothesis, that distance and education positively influence remittances. This 
result  implies  that  liquidity  constraints  matter  and  that  highly  educated  migrants  may 
compensate for the drain of skilled migrants. Beyond this discriminatory test, we confirm the 
positive influence of migrant networks on remittances. Such networks increase migration, 
which raises remittances. This result holds even if we deal with its potential simultaneity by 
using an instrumental variable estimator. Finally, we identify different effects on remittances 
according to different types of immigration policies. 
The  remainder  of  this  part  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2,  we  briefly  discuss 
theoretical issues to derive remarkable theoretical predictions. In section 3, we present our 
bilateral  remittances  data  set.  In  section  4,  we  design  our  empirical  model.  Results  are 
exposed in section 5. Finally, we conclude in section 6. 
 
1.2. Theoretical issues 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) provide an excellent review of the recent theoretical and 
empirical  economic  literature  on  migrants'  remittances.  They  classify  the  different 
motivations  to  remit  in  two  categories:  individual  and  familial  arrangements.  We  briefly 
review these two categories and point out some remarkable theoretical predictions. 
 
1.2.1. Individual motives 
One of the most intuitive motivation to remit is altruism (Becker, 1974; Stark, 1995). 
Immigrants  care  of  those  left  behind.  The  altruistic  model  derives  some  interesting 
predictions. Remittances increase with the migrant's income but decrease with the migrant's 
family income, the duration of migration and the distance from family. However, remittances 
are not only determined by altruism, but also by economic reasons (Lucas and Stark, 1985). 
Another major individual motivation is the exchange motive (Bernheim, Shleifer, Summers, 
1985;  Cox,  1987):  the  migrant  makes  transfers  in  return  for  services  provided  by  family 
members or third persons such as taking care of the migrant's assets and/or relatives. In that 
hypothesis, the likelihood and size of remittances depend on the migrant's intention to return. 
As a result, remittances are a decreasing function of education, since educated migrants are  
  9
supposed  to  have  lower  propensities  to  return  (Rapoport  and  Docquier,  2006).  Beyond 
altruism and exchange, concern for inheritance is another individualistic motive to remit (de 
la Brière et al., 2002). Remittances may raise the probability to inherit. In this framework, 
remittances are assumed to be an increasing function of the migrant's income and a decreasing 
function of the migrant's remoteness. 
 
1.2.2. Familial arrangements motives 
The decision to remit cannot be understood only as an individual decision. Migration and 
remittances are parts of an informal familial arrangement. In this respect, remittances may be 
better explained by family arrangements than individual considerations. 
First,  migration  and  the  associated  remittance  flows  may  be  modeled  as  an  insurance 
contract (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rosenzweig, 1988). The family operates as an insurance 
company  which  protects  its  members  against  shocks.  Thus,  remittance  flows  allow  to 
diversify the sources of income. Second, remittances may be seen as loan repayments. Under 
this hypothesis, the family works as an internal and informal financial market. It pays the cost 
of emigration and/or investments in education of young family members (Cox and Jimenez, 
1992; Poirine, 1997; Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999). Thus, the migrant becomes a borrower and 
sends back remittances to reimburse her family. The family loan arrangements model derives 
some testable and remarkable predictions.
14 The higher are the migration and education costs 
supported by the family, the higher are the remittances. Consequently, remittances increase 
with the migrant's education level and the distance from family. 
Among the family arrangements models, the loan repayment hypothesis seems the most 
relevant for our study. The insurance hypothesis is a better working assumption for the least 
developed countries where political, economic, social and environmental instability is strong. 
In this context, remittances may alleviate poverty.
15 By contrast, Romania and Bulgaria have 
recently  joined  the  European  Union  (EU)  and  cannot  be  considered  as  a  least  developed 
country. Moreover, the loan repayment hypothesis is in line with the most recent migratory 
                                                            
14 The loan repayment motivation is also known as the investment motive. This expression may introduce some 
confusion since it has been used also to denote remittances governed by portfolio considerations (see e.g. Lueth 
and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006) or by inheritance considerations (see e.g. de la Brière et al., 2002).  
15 See for instance Hoddinott (1994) for Kenya; Cox, Eser, Jimenez (1998) for Peru, or Azam and Gubert (2005) 
for Mali.  
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trends: large cost of international migration, importance of diaspora, drain of skilled migrants 
and costly human capital investments. 
Our aim is to discriminate among the alternative theories of remittances described above. 
We have notably remarkable predictions concerning education and distance. However, we 
keep in mind that “a combination of different motives applies […]. It is not only that different 
individuals  may  be  heterogeneous  in  their  motivations  to  remit  but  also  that  different 
motivations to remit may coexist within the same individual” (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). 
 
1.3. Bilateral remittances data 
Bilateral data of remittances have been collected from central banks and come specifically 
from three different sources. The first source of bilateral remittances comes from the National 
Bank of Romania (NBR). Data are collected via (i) banks reports for amounts received in 
banks accounts, (ii) reports of the money transfer companies such as Western Union and 
Money Gram and (iii) reports of the National Post Office for amounts sent via postal orders.
16 
We identify recorded flows to Romania from 17 source countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Cyprus,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and  the United States. Data  are on a quarterly 
frequency  and  we  cover  2005,  2006  and  2007.  Before  2005,  only  global  information  on 
remittances is available. It should be noted that for Cyprus, we cover 2005 and 2007. For 
Israel, we cover 2005, 2006 and the two quarters of 2007. For Turkey, we cover 2005. Thus, 
we get a potential of 190 observations. 
The  second  source  of  bilateral  remittances  comes  from  the  National  Bank  of  Albania 
(NBA).  We  identify  recorded  flows  to  Albania  from  17  source  countries:  Argentina, 
Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Data are on a quarterly frequency and we cover 2006. 
Thus, we get 68 observations. 
The third source of bilateral remittances comes from the National Bank of Italy (NBI), 
which is one of the main sending countries of the SEE. We identify recorded flows from Italy 
to Bulgaria (2005, 2006 and the first two quarters of 2007), to Serbia (the first two quarters of 
2007) and to Romania  (1997 to 2006  and the  first two quarters of 2007). Data are on a 
                                                            
16 In addition, the NBR estimates that around 40 percent of remittances are coming through informal channels.   
  11 
monthly  frequency,  but  for  the  purpose  of  the  study,  we  convert  the  monthly  data  on  a 
quarterly basis. Thus, we get 54 observations.  
For  the  empirical  analysis,  we  use  three  different  separate  samples.  We  first  work 
exclusively on bilateral remittances from the National Bank of Romania (190 observations). 
Second,  we  work  on  the  bilateral  remittances  from  the  National  Bank  of  Albania  (68 
observations). Finally, we use all the available bilateral remittances data from the above three 
sources: NBR, NBA and NBI. However, we drop the bilateral relationship Italy-Romania 
from the NBR in 2005, 2006 and 2007 to avoid data redundancy. So, we get a potential of 300 
observations  (=  178  +  68  +  54).  Aggregating  the  data  allows  to  draw  more  general 
conclusions. On the downside, the aggregation does not account for the fact that the methods 
of collecting data are quite heterogeneous (see below).  
Data constraints are relatively strong in the literature on bilateral remittances. The large 
majority of papers does not identify the sending country. To circumvent such data constraints, 
some researchers derive bilateral remittance flows indirectly by using bilateral migration data 
(Harisson,  Britton  and  Swanson,  2004;  Ratha  and  Shaw,  2007).  This  method  allows 
quantifying the remittance phenomenon but is inappropriate for an econometric treatment. As 
far as we know, Straubhaar (1986), Lianos (1997) and Karafolas (1998) are among the first 
studies using observed bilateral data.
17 These studies are stimulating, but Karafolas (1998) 
neglects  the  principal  determinants  of  remittances,
18  while  Straubhaar  (1986)  and  Lianos 
(1997) are based on a tiny number of bilateral relationships.
19 
Two recent papers done independently and concurrently to ours work on large samples of 
bilateral remittances. First,  Lueth  and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) use a sample of 11 destination 
countries. Each one has recorded flows from about 16 source countries and different period of 
time. They estimate a gravity model for remittance flows and find that economic size (source 
and recipient countries GDP) and transaction costs (distance, common language or common 
                                                            
17 To approximate bilateral flows, another strand of the literature uses total remittance flows of a given country 
and compute average characteristics of its  main emigration countries to derive a bilateral analysis (see e.g. 
Elbadawi and Rocha, 1992; El Sakka and McNabb, 1999). 
18 Using data on Greece and Portugal, Karafolas (1998) shows that the presence of banks of the emigration 
country in the recipient country positively influences the volume of bilateral remittances. 
19 Lianos (1997) works on two different samples: a first sample of 31 remittance flows from Germany (1961-
1991) to Greece and a second sample of 23 remittance flows from Belgium (1981-1991) and Sweden (1980-
1991) to Greece. Straubhaar (1986) uses a time series of 19 remittance flows from Germany to Turkey, during 
the period 1963-1982.  
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border)  explain  more  that  50  percent  of  their  variation.  However,  the  gravity  equation  is 
originally theoretically derived to model trade flows and it is not clear why transaction costs 
matter so much for remittances originating from a developed country. Transaction costs are 
not usually an issue for large remittances (Hernandez-Coss, 2006) and are not an increasing 
function of geographical distance, the commonly used proxy for bilateral transaction costs. 
For instance, to transfer $200 to the USA banks charge $17 from Colombia for a capital-to-
capital distance of 3,845 kms, $3 from Mexico for 3,038 kms, and $1.8 to $4 from Philippines 
for 13,794 kms. Thus, the cost of sending remittances seems unrelated to the geographical 
distance but “determined by the level of competition, relative size of the remittances volume 
and reflects the limited expansion of the financial sector in developing countries, particularly 
among the poor” (Hernandez-Coss, 2006).
 20 As a result, the use of the trade gravity model 
seems not fully suitable for explaining remittances.
21 Second, Schiopu and Siegfried (2006) 
work on a sample of 21 Western European remitters and 7 European neighboring receivers, 
over the period 2000-2005. They investigate the role of altruistic and investment portfolio 
motives. They find evidence for altruism on the belief that the difference in GDP between the 
recipient and source countries increases bilateral remittances. We may wonder, however, if 
such a difference is a good indicator to capture altruism motives. 
Using large samples of observations introduces more variability on remittance patterns 
and allows for more general results. On the downside, remittances are recorded in a very 
different ways among the given destination countries and this heterogeneity undermines the 
scope of the results. Working on a more homogeneous sample of recipient countries reduces 
the size of the sample but avoids the previous shortcoming. Flows are recorded in a more 





                                                            
20  Ratha  and  Shaw  (2007)  raise  a  similar  point.  They  find  evidence  for  higher  remittance  costs  between 
developing countries. They also find that the cost of remitting 200$ from a developed country to a developing 
country is significantly much lower than the cost of remitting the same amount in the opposite way. 
21 Moreover, one of the main insights from the trade theory is that bilateral trade depends on relative trade 
barriers, i.e. on the average  trade resistance between a country and its trading partners (Anderson and  van 
Wincoop, 2003). Such a mechanism appears irrelevant to explain bilateral remittances.  
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1.4. Empirical model 
We now present our empirical model which enables us to discriminate among alternative 
theories of remittances. Based on the most recent empirical literature, our specification is 
designed as follows: 
Bilateral Remittances = f (migrant's education; bilateral distance; bilateral factors; 
labor-receiving factors; labor-sending factors), 
where  the  Bilateral  Remittances  variable  represents  bilateral  flows  of  remittances  that 
Southeastern immigrants send back home. 
 
Migrant's education and bilateral distance 
Migrant's Education is the average education level of migrants in a given source country of 
remittances. Bilateral Distance is the geographic distance between capital of the source and 
recipient countries. In line with the loan repayment hypothesis, we expect a positive sign for 
both education and distance elasticities. 
We  also  control  for  various  observable  factors  of  the  source  country  of  remittances  [(1) 
economic size, (2) exchange rate, (3) unemployment rate and (4) immigration policy] and the 
recipient country of remittances [(5) economic size and (6) political stability]. Let us first 
briefly review the evidence on these four groups of control variables. 
 
Labor-receiving country factors 
(1) Economic size. Empirical literature is unanimous on the effect of the economic size of the 
labor-receiving country on remittances. The aggregate income of the labor-receiving country 
(i.e. the source country of remittances) positively influences the volume of remittances sent 
abroad  (see  among  others  Swamy,  1981;  Elbadawi  and  Rocha,  1992).  These  results  are 
consistent with the patterns displayed using simple descriptive statistics. According to the 
World Bank, the United States is the main sending countries in 2004 with 39 billion dollars 
(Ratha, 2005). However, the aggregate income, proxied by GDP, mixes the income of natives 
and immigrants. Ideally, we would like to assess, for instance, only the aggregate income 
effect of the Romanian immigrants on remittances to Romania. However, data for such an 
ideal  are  unavoidable.  To  mitigate  this  problem  we  control  additionally  for  the  stock  of 
Romanian immigrants in the labor-receiving country. Thus, remittances sent by country i to 
country j are positively related to the income of country i and the number of country j's  
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immigrants in country i.
22 A concern of this estimation strategy is the simultaneity between 
migration and remittances. A high inflow of remittances from a given sending country may 
incite  potential  migrants  to  emigrate  in  that  country.  We  treat  this  problem  using  an 
instrumental variable estimator. 
(2) Exchange rate. A variation of the exchange rate (expressed as units of the recipient's 
currency per unit of the source country) affects the purchasing power of remittances and leads 
to an ambiguous effect. For instance, an appreciation of the remitter's currency may increase 
remittances  to  benefit  from  an  increasing  purchasing  power  (income  effect)  or  decrease 
remittances due to a substitution effect. The substitution effect is empirically documented in 
the bilateral relationship between Greece and Germany (Lianos, 1997). 
(3) Unemployment rate. The most striking result related to the labor market situation in the 
labor-receiving country concerns the effect of the unemployment rate. It negatively impacts 
on the volume of remittances. Three explanations are at hand. First, a rise of unemployment 
causes  significant  losses  of  income  which  reduce  remittances.  Second,  an  increase  of  the 
unemployment rate raises macroeconomic uncertainty about future incomes, and may incite 
migrants to decrease their remittances in anticipation. Finally, a high rate of unemployment 
reduces the migrant's probability to be employed and consequently the probability to remit. In 
fact, in all the OECD countries, except Italy and Greece, unemployment affects immigrants 
especially (OECD, 2006a). In addition, Higgins, Hysengegasi and Pozo (2004) and evidence 
that the propensity to remit strongly decreases with the duration of unemployment. 
(4) Immigration policy. Restrictive immigration policies are one of the most salient facts 
among  the  new  trends  in  international  migration.  OECD  countries  have  reinforced  their 
controls to fight against terrorism and prevent irregular migration. We first characterize three 
different types of immigration policies and then wonder whether they affect remittances. 
Migration policy differs from one country to another,
23 but we identify similarities among 
groups of countries. We base our identification on the recent OECD report on international 
migration  (OECD,  2006b),  which  is  the  main  source  depicting  immigration  policies  in 
developed countries. We identify three relatively homogeneous groups in terms of migration 
policy. Fist, we identify North America as distinct group. Docquier et al. (2007b) suggest that 
the structure of the North America immigration differs from that of Europe. In fact, migration 
to Western Europe is more recent than to the United States and Canada, which are considered 
                                                            
22 This approach is used in the literature to derive indirectly bilateral remittance flows (see Ratha and Shaw, 
2007 and above). 
23 Note that the EU immigration policy is not yet harmonized among member countries.  
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as “installation countries” long ago. In addition, North America countries attract more skilled 
migrants than European countries (see Table 1.5 in Appendix 1.8). Second, in contrast to 
Docquier  et  al.  (2007b),  we  account  for  the  heterogeneity  of  immigration  policies  across 
Western European countries and operate a further distinction between old and new European 
immigration  countries.  North  and  Central  European  countries  are  considered  as  old 
immigration countries. They promoted a mass migration since the post-war period until the 
seventies. Later, they adopted restrictive immigration policies. We regroup Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in the so-called “old 
immigration  countries”.  In  contrast,  the  patterns  of  migration  of  the  “new  immigration 
countries”, gathering Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia, Portugal, Spain 
and Turkey, are different: historically they were immigrant-source countries and then they 
became  immigrant-receiving  countries.  Two  complementary  reasons  are  usually  invoked. 
First, they developed and became more attractive in terms of migration. Second, they served 
as a transit area to join the old immigration countries, which closed their borders after the 
seventies. 
Immigration  policies  may  affect  remittances  through  two  channels.  First,  Southeastern 
emigration to Western Europe appears to be more temporary and more often related to a 
return project in the country of origin. The intent to return home is hypothesized to induce 
greater  savings  and  remittances  (Lucas,  2004).  The  evidence  suggests  that  temporary 
migration results in greater remittances than from permanent settlers (Elbadawi and Rocha, 
1992; Rodriguez and Horton, 1995; Lucas, 2004). For sake of illustration, we find, using 
OECD data on naturalization rates, that on average 26 percent of Romanian official migrants 
are  naturalized  in  new  immigration  countries
24  against  59  percent  in  old  immigration 
countries
25  and  65  percent  for  installation  countries.  Ceteris  paribus,  we  expect  greater 
remittances from new immigration countries. Second, restrictive immigration policies aim to 
prevent irregular immigration. Given that illegal Southeastern emigration to Western Europe 
is easier than to North America we expect a higher stock of illegal migrants in the former 
group and consequently higher remittances. Moreover, within Western Europe, given more 
restrictive policies in old immigration countries, we expect again higher remittances from new 
immigration countries. 
                                                            
24 Note that Turkey inflates this average. Without Turkey, the average rate of the new immigration countries falls 
to 13 percent.  
25 Due to lack of data, the average rate for old immigration countries does not include the United Kingdom and 
Germany.  
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Labor-sending country factors 
(5) Economic size. Empirical literature is not unanimous on the effect of the labor-sending 
country’s  GDP  on  remittances  (Buch  and  Kuckulenz,  2004;  Vargas-Silva  Huang,  2005). 
Effects  are  ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand,  increasing  GDP  may  lower  emigration  and  the 
associated remittances. On the other hand, increasing GDP may encourage migrants to invest 
at home and, thus, to increase remittances. Both trends tend to cancel and the literature mainly 
finds a no significant effect of the labor-sending country's income on remittance flows. 
(6)  Political  stability.  The  evidence  regarding  the  political  situation  of  the  labor-sending 
country on remittances is not conclusive (Aydas et al., 2005; Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006). 
While some studies found that political instability discourages remittances to labor-sending 
country, other studies suggest that political instability may increase remittances to help family 
members' stayed at home. 
Based on the previous analysis, we estimate the following equation: 
ln(remittances)ij =  β0 + β1 ln(Educ)ij + β2 ln(Dist)ij + β3 ln(Stock_mig)ij  
+ β4 ln(Exchange_Rate)ij + β5 ln(GDP)i + β6 (Unemployment_Rate)i  
+ β7 (Old_mig)i  + β8 (New_mig)i + β9 ln(GDP)j  
+ β10 ln(Political_Stability)j + trend + εij, 
(1.1) 
where  the  dependent  variable  Remittancesij  is  the  value  of  bilateral  remittances  from  the 
source country i to the recipient country j. 
The explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
￿  Educij denotes the average education level of immigrants j in country i, 
￿  Distij is the distance between countries i and j. 
￿  GDPi is the Gross Domestic Product of country i. 
￿  Stock_Immigij denotes the stock of Southeastern immigrants j in country i. 
￿  Exchange_Rateij denotes the nominal exchange rate of country i facing the currency of 
country j. 
￿  Unemployment_Ratei is the unemployment rate of country i. 
￿  Old_migi  is  a  binary  variable  which  is  unity  if  country  i  is  an  old  immigration 
country
26 and zero otherwise; 
￿  New_migi  is  a  binary  variable  which  is  unity  if  country  i  is  a  new  immigration 
country
27 and zero otherwise. 
 
                                                            
26 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
27 Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.  
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The  introduction  of  these  dummies  amounts  to  control  for  region  specific 
characteristics.
28 
￿  GDPj is the Gross Domestic of country j. 
￿  Political_Stabilityj measures the political stability of country j. 
￿  trend is a linear trend. 
￿   εij represents the usual error term capturing unobserved factors and mis-measurements 
of the remittances level. 
Table 1.3 provides  greater details regarding the data construction and  Tables 1.4 and 1.6 
provide summary statistics for the variables (see Appendix 1.8) . The coefficients of interest 
to us are β1 and β2 which helps to discriminate among alternative theories. 
 
1.5. Results 
Estimating equation (1.1), we use three different sources of remittances data: NBR, NBA 
and NBI (see above). Our main analysis rests on the recipient country Romania (NNR) treated 
in section (5.1). Romania offers the largest collection of bilateral relationships of remittances 
in  the  SEE.  Moreover,  it  is  a  relevant  recipient  country,  attracting  a  growing  amount  of 
remittances.  Then,  in  section  (5.2)  we  use  a  more  comprehensive  dataset  to  check  the 
robustness of our results. 
 
1.5.1. The Romanian context 
Table  1.1  reports  the  estimation  of  equation  (1.1)  on  the  Romanian  context.  Using  a 
unique recipient country offers an important advantage: we do not need to introduce labor-
sending country factors which are always difficult to observe and capture. These factors only 
present a temporal variation captured by the trend variable. In columns (1) to (4), we use the 
Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  estimator  and  in  columns  (5)  and  (6)  the  Instrumental 
Variables (IV) estimator. In all regressions, the heteroscedasticity is corrected using White 
(1980)'s correction. The estimated equation explains around 80 to 90 percent of the variance 
of bilateral remittances. 
In column (1), we estimate equation (1.1) without our main variables of interest: education 
and distance. With the exception of the exchange rate estimate, all the estimated coefficients 
                                                            
28 The installation countries (Canada and the United States) represent the base group against which comparisons 
are made.  
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are  statistically  significant  and  economically  reasonable.  As  expected,  economic  size 
variables exhibit a positive effect on remittances. First, holding other factors constant, a 1% 
increase in sending country GDP raises remittances by about 0.87% in average. Second, a 1% 
increase in the stock of migrants raises remittances by about 0.34% in average. A reasonable 
explanation of the latter estimate is that the stock of migrants favors additional migration by 
providing better information on the labor-receiving country and creating cultural proximities. 
In addition, we find a significant negative impact of the unemployment rate. This effect is 
expected: an unemployment rise increases macroeconomic instability, causes significant loss 
of income and reduces the migrant’s probability to be employed. Finally, migration policies 
tend to influence the patterns of remittances. As expected, the results establish a clear ranking: 
European  new  immigration  countries  tend  to  remit  more  than  European  old  immigration 
countries. The Wald statistic reported at the bottom of Table 1.1 indicates this difference is 
highly significant with a p-value lower than 0.01. Moreover, old immigration countries appear 
to remit more than North American installation countries. Two complementary explanations 
have been suggested above. First, migration to Western Europe seems to be more temporary. 
The empirical evidence suggests that temporary migration results in greater remittances than 
from permanent settlers (Elbadawi and Rocha, 1992; Rodriguez and Horton, 1995; Lucas, 
2004). A second explanation is that immigration policy variables may capture the effect of 
illegal migration on remittances. The less restrictive the immigration policy is, the higher the 
flow of irregular migration and the amount of (official) remittances.  
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Table 1.1: Bilateral remittances on the Romanian context 
 
  Dependent Variable: Ln (Remittance Flows) 
Column:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Method:  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Ln (Migrant’s Education)ij 
 
Ln (Bilateral Distance)ij 
 
Ln (Stock of Migrants)ij 
 




Ln (Unemployment Rate)i 
 
(Old Immigration Country)i [A] 
 
















































































































































































Wald Statistic (Ho: A=B) 













Coefficients on instrumental variables in first stage 
Dependant variable = Ln (Stock of Migrants)ij 
Ln (Religious Fractionalization)i 
 
Ln (Language Diversity)i 
 












[p – value] 
Hansen J-Statistic 
[p – value] 








Notes: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses, with a, b and c denoting the significance at 1, 5 
and 10% level respectively. Constant is not reported. Instrumental variables in model (5) use the log of the 
religious fractionalization as an instrument. Column (6) adds the log of the linguistic diversity as an additional 
instrument. The first stage also includes other explanatory variables included in the second stage.  
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In  column  (2),  we  investigate  the  impact  of  migrant's  education  on  remittances  and 
estimate equation (1.1) without the distance variable. We find a statistically and economically 
significant  positive  effect  of  migrant's  education.  A  1%  increase  in  education  raises 
remittances by  about 0.6%, holding other factors fixed. This effect is  consistent with the 
investment/repayment loan hypothesis. Moreover, we may argue that higher remittances of 
highly educated migrants may compensate for the brain drain effect. This is all the more 
important since, according to the  OECD 2005  foreign-born and  expatriates data set, one-
quarter of total Romanian immigrants are highly skilled immigrants. A core concern is the 
difficulty to capture the effect of the migrant's income on remittances. Educated migrants earn 
relatively more than non-educated and will therefore remit more. Consequently, the education 
estimate may be upward biased. As noted above, we address this shortcoming by assuming 
that the migrant income is positively related to the GDP of the sending country. Moreover, we 
mitigate the problem that GDP mixes the income of natives and immigrants by controlling for 
the stock of Romanian immigrants in the given sending country. 
The positive correlation between education and remittances is in line with Cox, Eser and 
Jimenez  (1998)
29  and  older  evidence  (Johnson  and  Whitelaw,  1974;  Rempel  and  Lobfell, 
1978). However, this correlation somewhat conflicts with Rodriguez and Horton (1995) and 
Faini (2007). They do not find evidence that education impacts on remittances. Rodriguez and 
Horton (1995) use a rich series of national surveys and provide a systematic description of 
international  return  migrants  from  the  Philippines.  In  a  stimulating  study,  Faini  (2007) 
regresses  total  remittances  received  by  developing  countries  on  the  share  of  the  skilled 
emigrants in the total population of the source country of remittances. He finds a negative 
coefficient but not statistically different from zero.
30 Thus, the educational level of migrants 
has no impact on remittances. This result suggests that the positive effect of education on 
remittances may not be generalized to all recipient countries (see below). 
Other results of column (2) are broadly comparable with those of column (1) but some 
differences are worth mentioning. The effect of the stock of migrants is now economically 
more important with an elasticity of 0.50. The literature finds even larger estimates. Lianos 
(1997) and Aydas, Neyapti and Metin-Ozcan (2005) find a 0.9 elasticity and Elbadawi and 
                                                            
29 Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998) test for the altruism and exchange motives for private transfers. However, “the 
type of exchange envisioned in their study is a loan repayment of educational  investments” (Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2006). 
30 A concern is the endogeneity of the migration which appears not to be adequately addressed (see below).  
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Rocha (1992) a unitary elasticity. The impact of the bilateral exchange rate is now statistically 
significant.  An  appreciation  of  the  sending  country's  currency  against  the  Romanian  Lei 
creates an income effect and raises remittances to Romania. This intuitive finding conflicts 
with the substitution effect found in Lianos (1997) in the Greek case.
31 Controlling for the 
effect of education, the differences between installation, old and new immigration countries 
increased. This is easily explained by the fact that Romanian immigrants in the installation 
countries  (Canada  and  United  States)  are  on  average  more  educated  (see  Table  1.5  in 
Appendix 1.8). 
In column (3), we investigate the impact of distance on remittances and estimate equation 
(1.1)  without  the  education  variable.  We  find  a  statistically  and  economically  significant 
positive  effect  of  the  bilateral  distance.  Ceteris  paribus,  a  1%  increase  in  distance  from 
recipient country leads to, on average, a 0.8% increase in bilateral remittances. This new 
evidence is again consistent with the investment/repayment loan hypothesis. Migratory costs 
increase with geographic distance, implying a higher “loan” to cover migratory expenses. 
Assuming this loan is supported by the family stayed at home, it leads in return to a higher 
remittance  flow.  In  addition,  controlling  for  distance  raises  again  the  difference  between 
installation countries and the two other groups. This increasing difference is explained by the 
relative remoteness of installation countries compared to Romania. 
In  column  (4),  we  estimate  equation  (1.1)  and  include  both  education  and  distance 
variables. The estimated coefficient of distance is still significant, with the expected sign. 
Education  has  a  positive  sign  but  is  significant  only  at  the  10%  level.  Other  results  are 
basically unchanged with respect to columns (2) and (3).  
In the last two columns, we check if our results are robust to an endogeneity issue.
32 In 
fact, we may suspect a reverse causality between the stock of immigrants and remittances. It 
                                                            
31 Lianos (1997) finds that the exchange rate has a negative effect because of continuing devaluation of the 
Greek drachma against the German mark. As a result, migrants tend to postpone remittances as long as possible. 
32 We also checked the robustness of our results to alternative specifications. The results are available upon 
request.  We  first  have  substituted  population  (pop)  and  GDP  per  capita  (GDP/POP)  for  GDP,  to  control, 
respectively, for size and development differences across source countries of remittances. The results show that 
an increase in source country per capita income and population increase remittances. The other results remained 
unchanged compared to column (4) of Table 1.1. Second, we have imposed a unitary coefficient to the stock of 
migrants, by moving the variable ln(StockMigrants) to the left hand side of the equation (1.1). In this way, we 
express  the  dependent  variable  as  remittances  per  migrant.  We  find  that  the  unitary  constraint  inflates  the 
estimates of distance and education.  
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is quite likely that a high inflow of remittances from a given sending country may incite 
potential emigration to that country. Exploiting differences in religious heterogeneity as an 
instrument for the stock of immigrants, we find that our results are robust to the instrumental 
variable estimator. The exclusion restriction is that the religious fractionalization of a country 
has  no  effect  on  remittances,  other  than  its  effect  through  an  increase  in  the  stock  of 
immigrants. This is because “measured religious fractionalization tends to be higher in more 
tolerant  and  free  societies”  (Alesina  et  al.,  2003)  and  such  societies  appear  to  be  more 
attractive for migrants.
33 The measure of religious fractionalization is based on data from the 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2001) and taken from Alesina et al. (2003). The first-stage result 
shows  that  the  estimate  of  the  religious  fractionalization  variable  (in  log)  is  positive  and 
economically  and  statistically  highly  significant  (see  bottom  of  Table  1.1).  The  large  F-
statistic indicates that this instrument provides a good fit in the first stage regression (column 
5).
34 Moreover, the partial r-square of the first stage regression is also quite large (0.65). The 
two stage least squares estimates in column (5) produce results which are almost identical to 
the OLS estimates of column (4). Note that the estimates of our interest variables education 
and distance have inflated and both are now highly statistically significant (p<0.01).  
Our  empirical  strategy  might  capture  the  effect  of  religious  fractionalization  on 
remittances, but working through other channels. We deal with this concern, in column (6), 
with a simple overidentification test using a measure of linguistic diversity as an additional 
instrument. A diversity of tongues in a country is likely to be highly correlated with migration 
but not with remittances. The measure of language diversity comes from Melitz (2008). As 
expected,  in  the  first-stage,  the  estimate  of  diversity  (in  log)  has  a  positive  and  highly 
significant  effect  on  the  stock  of  migrants.  The  large  F-statistic  indicates  that  our  two 
restriction  variables  provide  again  a  good  fit  in  the  first  stage  regression.  Moreover,  the 
Sargan  overidentification  test  (with  the  p-value  of  0.36)  supports  the  validity  of  the 
instruments. The overall results are still little affected and the positive effect of distance and 
distance on remittances is in line with the loan repayment hypothesis. 
                                                            
33 Faini (2007) controls for the possibility that total migration is endogenous by using the geographic distance as 
an instrument. Our regressions show that this instrument is inappropriate since it affects remittances. 
34  As  a  rule  of  thumb,  Staiger  and  Stock  (1997)  recommend  a  first-stage  F-statistic  of  at  least  ten  for  an 
instrument not to be considered weak.  
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1.5.2. The “comprehensive” dataset  
We now proceed to the estimation of equation (1.1) by polling data coming from our three 
different sources: Romania (NBR), Albania (NBA) and Italy (NBI). On the one hand, Albania 
is another major recipient country in the SEE, since remittances exceed a quarter of Albania’s 
GDP in 2006. Other in other hand, Italy is one of the main labor-receiving countries for SEE’s 
migrants and one of the main remitters to the SEE. This larger dataset offers two advantages 
to check the robustness of our results. First, we get a larger number of observations with 
potentially  300  observations  and  second  we  extend  the  time  period  from  1997  to  2007. 
However,  we  should  now  control  for  labor-sending  country's  factors  since  we  get  four 
recipient countries: Romania, Albania and two additional recipient countries related to the 
Italian dataset:  Bulgaria and Serbia. We now estimate equation (1.1) including the labor-
sending country factors: an income variable (Ln GDPj) and a variable measuring the political 
stability of the country (Politica_Stabilityj).  
The results are reported in Table 1.2. They are in line with those of Table 1.1. 
In column (1), we estimate equation (1.1). All the estimates are statistically significant, 
except those related to the labor-sending country factors (income and political stability). This 
result  complies  with  the  empirical  literature  which  does  not  find  conclusive  evidence 
regarding these factors. As noted above, their effects are ambiguous in sign. On the one hand, 
increasing GDP may lower emigration and the associated remittances. On the other hand, 
increasing GDP may encourage migrants to invest at home and, thus, to increase remittances. 
The effect of the political situation is also ambiguous. On the one hand, increasing political 
instability  may  discourage  remittances  to  labor-sending  country.  On  the  other  hand, 
increasing political instability may increase remittances to help family members' stayed at 
home.  The  estimates  of  our  variables  of  interest  are  statistically  significant.  Migrant's 
education and bilateral distance have a positive influence on remittances received by SEE 
countries. 
In column (2), we capture the labor-sending country factors with country fixed effects 
instead  of  income  and  political  stability  variables.  Our  results  are  broadly  unchanged. 
Education and distance remain positive, meaning that remittances received by Southeastern 
countries may be seen as a loan repayment for the costs of migrant education and emigration. 
As  in  Table  1.1,  we  check  if  our  results  are  robust  to  endogeneity  running  from 
immigrants stocks to remittances. In column (3), we use the religious fractionalization of the  
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source country of remittances as the exclusion restriction The first-stage result shows that the 
estimate of the religious fractionalization variable (in log) is again positive and statistically 
highly significant (see bottom of Table 1.2). The large F-statistic indicates that this instrument 
provides a good fit in the first stage regression (column 3). Recall that this instrument is based 
on the idea that religious fractionalization of a country, leading to more tolerant and free 
societies, has no effect on remittances, other than its effect through an increase in the stock of 
immigrants. The two stage least squares estimates in column (3) produce results which are 
almost identical to the OLS estimates of column (2) with labor-sending country fixed effects. 
Note that here only the estimate of our variable of interest distance has inflated. In column 
(4), we introduce our second instrument, the linguistic diversity of the sourcecountry. Here, 
its estimate is not statistically significant but the Sargan overidentification test (with the p-
value of 03.1) still supports the validity of the instruments. The overall results are still little 
affected and the positive effect of distance and distance on remittances is again in line with 
the loan repayment hypothesis.  
  25 
 
Table 1.2: Bilateral remittances on the “comprehensive” dataset 
 
  Dependent Variable: Ln (Remittance Flows) 
Column:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Method:  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Ln (Migrant’s Education)ij 
 
Ln (Bilateral Distance)ij 
 
Ln (Stock of Migrants)ij 
 




Ln (Unemployment Rate)i 
 
(Old Immigration Country)i [A] 
 


















































































































































Wald Statistic (Ho: A=B) 









Coefficients on instrumental variables in first stage 
Dependant variable = Ln (Stock of Migrants)ij 
Ln (Religious Fractionalization)i 
 
Ln (Language Diversity)i 
 










[p – value] 
Hansen J-Statistic 
[p – value] 








Notes: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses, with a and b denoting the significance at 1 and 
5 level respectively. Constant is not reported. Instrumental variables in model (3) use the log of the religious 
fractionalization as an instrument. Column (4) adds the log of the linguistic diversity as an additional instrument. 
The first stage also includes other explanatory variables included in the second stage.   
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1.6. Conclusion 
Whereas  literature  concentrates  mainly  on  the  impact  of  remittances  on  economic 
development,  the  present  contribution  analyzes  its  determinants.  In  this  first  part,  we 
reconsider this old question first to take account of recent shifting patterns of migration and 
second to try to discriminate among alternative theories of remittances. Two main theoretical 
motivations are at hand: individualistic motives and family arrangements motives. We find 
some  support  for  the  latter  motivations  and  notably  for  the  loan  repayment  hypothesis. 
Migrants send back remittances to reimburse family for migration costs and investments in 
human capital. Thus, we find that education and geographic distance from source to recipient 
countries positively influence remittances. However, this does not preclude the existence of 
other  familial  motives  (for  instance  insurance)  or  individualistic  motives  (for  instance 
altruism).  
These results imply first that liquidity constraints matter and second that remittances of 
highly educated migrants may compensate for the brain drain effect. This latter result is all the 
more  important  since,  for  instance,  one-quarter  of  total  Romanian  immigrants  are  highly 
skilled immigrants. However, the education effect may not be generalized to all recipient 
countries. SEE countries are recent emigrant countries. In the future, with longer duration of 
migration, skilled immigrants, earning higher wages abroad, will be more likely to reunite 
with their (immediate) family (Faini, 2007). As a result, they would probably decrease their 
remittances. This expectation could prove wrong as long as the loan to cover the emigration 
costs is provided by the extended family (Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999).  
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1.8. Appendix 
 
A. Summary statistics and variable definitions 
 
Table 1.3. Data and variable definitions 
Bilateral remittancesij  Various sources (see below). 
Migrant's educationij  Share of highly educated immigrants of country j in the total 
number of j’s immigrants in a given country i. Source: OECD 
Foreign-Born and Expatriates. 
Bilateral distanceij  Distance in kilometers between the largest cities of the two 
countries i and j. Source: CEPII. 
Stock of immigrantsij  Come from OECD Foreign-Born and Expatriates. Updated in 2005 
Exchange rateij  Country j’s currency per unit of foreign currency. Quarterly 
frequency. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF). 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product of country i or j. Come from the Vienna  
Institute  for  International  Economic  Studies  (WIIW).Vienna 
Institute f.  
. Quarterly frequency. 
Unemployment ratei  Extracted from OECD Stat Web Browse, except for Turkey (IMF). 
Quarterly frequency. 
Old immigration countryi  = 1 if the sending country is Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland or the United Kingdom, and 0 
otherwise. 
New immigration countryi  = 1 if the sending country is Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
or Turkey, and 0 otherwise. 
Political stabilityi  Come from the World Bank Governance Indicators 2005. 
Religious Fractionalization  Taken from Alesina et al. (2003). 
Language Diversity  Come from Melitz (2008). 
 
 
Table 1.4. Summary statistics (Romanian dataset) 
  Nb. of obs  Mean  Standard devation  Min  Max 
Ln (Bilateral remittances)ij 
Ln (Migrant’s education)ij 
Ln (Bilateral distance)ij 
Ln (Stock of Immigrants)ij 
Ln (Exchange Rate)ij 
Ln (GDP)i 
Ln (Unemployment Rate)i 
Old Immigration Countryi 
New Immigration Countryi 
Ln (Religious Fractionalization)I 
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Table 1.5. Percentage of Romanian migrants with tertiary education, 2006 



























Source: Authors’ computation on the OECD  
database, Foreign-Born and Expatriates 2005. 
 
 
Table 1.6. Summary statistics (comprehensive dataset) 
  Nb. Of obs  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
Ln (Bilateral Remittances)ij  300  16.46  2.28  9.22  21.7 
Ln (Migrant’s Education)ij  254  -1.60  0.59  -2.81  -0.59 
Ln (Bilateral Distance)ij  300  7.46  0.79  5.04  9.66 
Ln (Stock of Immigrants)ij  266  9.77  1.69  4.94  12.90 
Ln (Exchange Rate)ij  300  1.71  1.48  -0.78  5.22 
Ln (GDP)i  300  27.19  1.58  22.07  30.27 
Ln (Unemployment Rate)i  296  1.90  0.41  0.75  3.58 
Old Immigration Countryi  292  0.38  0.48  0  1 
New Immigration Countryi  292  0.45  0.49  0  1 
Ln (GDP)j  300  24.74  1.04  22.93  25.52 
Political Stabilityj  288  0.02  0.23  -0.77  0.43 
Ln (Religious Fractionalization)  300  -1.02  0.74  -5.31  0.19 
Ln (Language Diversity)  300  -1.83  1.03  -3.92  -0.36 
 
 
B. Bilateral remittances data 
Three sources: 
A. Romanian Source (National Bank of Romania).  
Data are collected via (i) banks reports for amounts received in banks accounts, (ii) reports of 
the money transfer companies such as Western Union and Money Gram and (iii) reports of 
the National Post Office for amounts sent via postal orders. We identify recorded flows to 
Romania  from  17  source  countries:  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Cyprus,  France,  Germany, 
Greece,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,  Switzerland,  Turkey,  the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Data are on a quarterly frequency and we cover 2005,  
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2006 and 2007. Before 2005, only global information on remittances is available. It should be 
noted that for Cyprus, we cover 2005 and 2007. For Israel, we cover 2005, 2006 and the two 
quarters of 2007. For Turkey, we cover 2005. Thus, we get a potential of 190 observations. 
Summary statistics  Nb. of obs  Mean  Standard deviation  Min  Max 
Bilateral Remittances  190  8.30e+07  1.52e+08  1801925  7.58e+08 
 
B. Albanian Source (National Bank of Albania) 
We  identify  recorded  ﬂows  to  Albania  from  17  source  countries:  Argentina,  Australia, 
Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  France,  Germany, 
Greece,  Hungary,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Saudi  Arabia,  Switzerland,  the  United 
Kingdom and the United States. Data are on a quarterly frequency and we cover 2006. Thus, 
we get 68 (= 17*4) observations.  
Summary statistics  Nb. of obs  Mean  Standard deviation  Min  Max 
Bilateral Remittances  68  1.72e+07  3.94e+07  10147  1.44e+08 
 
C. Italian Source (National Bank of Italy) 
We  identify  recorded  ﬂows  from  Italy  to  3  destination  countries:  Romania,  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia.  
￿  For Romania, data are on a monthly frequency. We cover 1997 to 2006 and the first 
six months of 2007. Thus, we get 126 (= 10*12 + 6) observations. 
￿  For Bulgaria, data are on a monthly frequency. We cover 2005, 2006 and the first six 
months of 2007. Thus, we get 30 (= 2*12 + 6) observations. 
￿  For Serbia, data are on a monthly frequency and for the first six months of 2007. Thus, 
we get 6 observations. 
In sum, we get 162 (= 126 + 30 + 6) observations. 
Summary statistics  Nb. of obs  Mean  Standard deviation  Min  Max 
Bilateral Remittances  162  1.79e+08  2.98e+08  245931  1.18e+09  
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Part 2. The microeconomic motives of remittances  
and their implications 
 
2.1. Remittances and transfer motives 
2.1.1. Introduction 
While  remittances  are  an  important  source  of  external  financing  for  developing 
countries,
35  they  also  provide  a  significant  share  of  the  disposable  income  for  many 
households and they play a vital role for their recipients in poor countries. For instance, Cox 
et al. (1998) find that 25% of the Peruvian households benefit from remittances and these 
transfers amount to 22% of their incomes. Given their magnitude, their implications on the 
recipients and in fine their potential effect on development, economists have paid a growing 
attention  to  these  private  transfers  from  abroad  during  the  last  twenty  years.  From  a 
microeconomic  perspective,  previous  studies  on  remittances  have  focused  on  the  two 
following aspects.  
On the one hand, some papers have attempted to understand why migrants remit a portion 
of their earnings to their family members left in the labor-sending country. From a theoretical 
viewpoint, several motives have been suggested to explain these transfers (see Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2006). A first motive deals with altruistic feelings, meaning that migrants care of 
those left behind. According to the second motivation, there is an exchange when the migrants 
remit for services provided by the recipients at home (Lucas and Stark, 1985). Another motive 
for remitting money stems from familial interactions. This may take the form of an insurance 
contract that protects its members against shocks (Rosenzweig, 1988), or remittances may be 
seen as a loan repayment for the costs of migrant education and emigration (Poirine, 1997). 
On the other hand, some studies have focused on the consequences of these transfers on 
the recipient households. A first issue deals with poverty alleviation. Adams (2006) finds that 
remittances have a large impact on reducing the depth and severity of poverty in Ghana
36. A 
                                                            
35 Remittances are more than twice as large as official aid and exceed, for some countries, the volume of foreign 
direct investment (Ratha, 2005). For instance, remittances to Albania are estimated to $1.2 billion in 2005, while 
foreign direct investment are estimated to $0.2 billion. 
36 Results from household surveys are less clear concerning the effect of remittances on income inequality (see 
Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Rodriguez, 1998).  
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second  issue  is  about  how  these  private  transfers  from  abroad  are  spent  or  invested. 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) observe that children living in recipient households have a 
lower mortality rate and a higher birth weight in Mexico. Edwards and Ureta (2003) find a 
positive impact of remittances on school attendance and retention in El Salvador. Remittances 
facilitate housing investments in Nigeria (Osili, 2004) and generate larger investments among 
small  enterprises  in  Mexico  (Woodruff  and  Zenteno,  2007). A  last  concern  is  the  role  of 
remittances on labor market decisions. Remittances are associated with a decrease in the labor 
force participation of women and men in Nicaragua (Funkhauser, 1992), and Yang (2008) 
highlights a depressing effect of remittances on labor supply of children in the Philippines. 
The theoretical models suggested so far in the economic literature allow deriving specific 
predictions to test the motives for remittances. Detailed information is needed to perform such 
tests  and  also  to  evaluate  the  implications  of  these  transfers  on  their  recipients,  since 
characteristics like income of both the migrants and the household recipients, distance from 
family  or  the  migrants’  education  are  needed  among  other  covariates.  From  an  empirical 
perspective, there is no clear consensus so far on the underlying motives for remittances (see 
Rapoport and Docquier, 2006) and there is also no clear conclusion from the studies dealing 
with the consequences of remittances as there are multiple, interdependent effects. So, this 
means that understanding both the motives for remitting money and their implications on 
recipient households is still a challenging task. 
The purpose of our contribution is to bring evidence on the motives of remittances and on 
their implications on the financial situation of the recipients in Albania. Unlike countries of 
Latin America for instance, it should be noted that studies on transfers from abroad in Eastern 
countries remain scarce. Specifically, we draw on a rich data set collected by the World Bank 
among households over the period 2002-2004 to document the pattern of remittances in that 
country. For various reasons, the case of Albania is a very relevant one. First, the country is an 
area of particularly high migration flows. According to the World Bank (2008), the stock of 
emigrants expressed as percentage of population is estimated to 27.5%. Secondly, Albania is 
characterized by a high uncertainty in terms of income due to the transformation from the 
communist system towards a market economy, meaning that additional sources of income like 
remittances should have a strong impact both on households and on the global economy. 
The Albanian Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS hereafter) is a panel, meaning 
that we are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level through the 
use of individual fixed effects. Another feature of the data is that in 2003, we have some  
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characteristics of respondents and all their adult children, living either in Albania or abroad, 
and information on remittances (if any) from the former category of children. Finally, there 
are subjective questions on the financial situation of the household. This detailed information 
offers a unique opportunity to bring new evidence to the motive issue.  
We proceed in the following way in our empirical analysis. First, we describe the pattern 
of remittances in Albania. We show that the bulk of these transfers is made by adult children 
and that remittances are mainly related to food and basic necessities. We then focus on the 
determinants of the transfers and study whether they are affected by individual characteristics. 
Using  random  and  fixed  effects  discrete  choice  models,  we  find  that  the  probability  of 
receiving a transfer is not really higher when the recipient is in a poor situation. Finally, we 
evidence a significantly positive effect of the transfer receipt on the financial situation. We 
correct the potential endogeneity bias of this covariate using two different methods. On the 
one hand, we treat the selection problem on the basis of observable characteristics and rely on 
a propensity score approach. On the other hand, when considering remittances from children, 
we instrument the receipt of transfer using the characteristics of the potential donor.  
The remainder of the first section of Part 2 is organized as follows. In subsection 2, we 
present  the  data.  The  pattern  of  remittances  in Albania  is  described  in  subsection  3.  We 
investigate the motives of the transfers in subsection 4 and examine their implications on the 
financial situation of the recipient households in subsection 5. Finally, in subsection 6, we 
conclude this first section. 
 
2.1.2. The LSMS Albanian data 
We use data from the LSMS project conducted in Albania at the beginning of the 2000s. 
The  survey  was  carried  out  by  the Albanian  Institute  of  Statistics  with  the  technical  and 
financial  assistance  of  the  World  Bank
37.  The  LSMS  project  is  an  international  effort 
supported by the World Bank in order to improve the quality of household survey data for 
policy needs. It is thus a crucial tool in measuring poverty in developing countries.  
Let us first describe the context of this ex-communist country along with the challenges 
faced  in  Albania  during  the  transition  to  a  market  economy.  Following  the  collapse  of 
communism, Albania has pursued strong reforms towards a market economy. After a period of 
                                                            
37 For further information on the Albanian LSMS survey, see the documentation of the World Bank available 
online: http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/index.htm.  
  37 
erratic growth in the early 1990’s, linked to economic transition and several political crises, 
the  GDP  has  increased,  5%  on  average  between  2000  and  2005.  However,  the  GDP  per 
inhabitant remains low, 2400 US$ in 2003. To date, living standards in Albania remain among 
the lowest in Europe and about one quarter of the Albanian population lives below the poverty 
line. The human development index (HDI) is lower than the average level observed in Eastern 
Europe, respectively 0.784 instead of 0.802.  
However, the proximity of attracting neighboring countries like Italy and Greece offers 
some opportunities of migration. Albania has recently emerged from a repressive political 
regime,  at  a  time  when  traveling  to  foreign  countries  was  totally  restricted. After  a  half-
century of isolation, the desire of Albanians to leave their country has been rapidly increasing. 
Recent events like the fall in national income, inflation, high unemployment and poverty, 
combined  with  episodes  of  political  instability,  have  strongly  boosted  migration  flows. 
Albania is now, as a portion of the population, the largest emigration country in Europe. 
According to the OECD database on immigrants and expatriates, around 64.4% of Albanian 
migrants live in Greece and 25.4% in Italy
38. 
As shown in Korovilas (1999), all these migrants have an important role in supporting the 
Albanian economy since a large proportion of their earnings is transferred back home. These 
transfers are larger than other aggregates like exports, foreign direct investment or foreign aid. 
Furthermore, inflows of remittances are increasing over time. Estimates of the National Bank 
of Albania indicate that remittances increased from 377.9 million US$ in 1994 to 1 billion 
US$ in 2004. Migrants’ funds represent a key source of foreign exchange and thus influence 
significantly incomes of Albanian households. 
In  this  study,  we  use  the  LSMS Albanian  longitudinal  data  and  consider  three  waves 
covering  the  period  from  2002  to  2004.  The  2002  LSMS  survey  was  a  nationally 
representative  sample  of  households  and  individuals  living  in  Albania.  The  sample  was 
designed  to  be  representative  of  urban  and  rural  areas  and  it  was  composed  of  3600 
households.  Four  questionnaires  were  used  in  order  to  collect  information:  a  household 
questionnaire, a diary recording household consumption, a community questionnaire and a 
price questionnaire. The focus in the following waves was only on the first instrument, i.e. the 
                                                            
38 Conversely, only 6.3% of Albanian migrants live in the United States.  
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household questionnaire
39. The sample sizes in 2003 and 2004 were approximately half of the 
original sample. 
We now describe the main questions of interest for our study. Concerning remittances, 
information in wave 1 (2002) is available in the transfers and social assistance module. It 
should be noted that the definition of the transfer variables includes both remittances and 
transfers from family members living in Albania. However, as we know where the donor lives 
(in Albania, Greece, Italy, United States, etc.), we can isolate transfers from abroad. We also 
know the relationship between the donor and the head of the household (spouse, children, 
siblings,  etc.).  The  amount  of  these  inflows,  either  cash  or  in-kind,  are  reported  in  the 
questionnaire and there is also some information on the main reasons explaining why the 
donor has provided this assistance (for instance for purchase of food and basic necessities, 
investment, medical expenses, etc).  
When  turning  to  the  second  wave  (2003),  the  corresponding  information  is  in  the 
migration module which is more detailed than in wave 1. In particular, there is an additional 
section on adult children living by their own, either in Albania or in a foreign country. For 
each adult child living abroad, we know whether the head of the household has received a 
remittance from this specific child and its amount (if any), and the questionnaire also includes 
the main uses of the transfer. We have also more detailed questions on possible remittances 
received from specific family members living abroad (like siblings, nephews, uncles, etc.). 
Finally, in 2004, the information is very similar to the one found in 2002 since there is a 
module on remittances and other sources of income. We know the relationship of each person 
remitting to the household and the head, the location of the remitter and the amount given. 
Unfortunately, there is no information in 2004 on the main uses of remittances. 
To assess the consequences of remittances on Albanian recipient households, we use a set 
of questions related to the current financial situation which are included in the subjective 
module of the Albanian LSMS survey. The first one is about subjective satisfaction: “How 
satisfied are you with your current financial situation?”. Possible answers are “fully satisfied”, 
“rather satisfied”, “less than satisfied”, and “not at all satisfied”. The second question is about 
the  current  level  of  food  consumption:  “Would  you  consider  the  current  level  of  food 
                                                            
39 The diary for household consumption, the community questionnaire and the price questionnaire were not 
repeated in 2003 and 2004. Significant efforts were indeed made to reduce the length and complexity of the 2002 
LSMS round. The second and third wave of the panel are a reduced version of the 2002 LSMS survey with some 
additional elements required for the panel, like details of people moving into and out of the household.  
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consumption  of  your  family  as…?”.  Possible  answers  are  “more  than  adequate”,  “just 
adequate”,  “less  than  adequate”. The  last  indicator  is  related  to  the  existence  of  liquidity 
constraints: “If you wanted to, could your household afford to...?”
40. Answers are given for 
each  of  the  following  items:  “have  friends  or  family  for  a  drink  or  meal  at  least  once  a 
month”, “pay for a week’s annual holiday away from home”, “replace worn out furniture”, 
“buy new rather than second hand clothes”, “eat meat, chicken or fish at least every second 
day”, “keep your house adequately warm”. We then construct an ordered indicator ranging 
from 0 to 6 measuring the number of items that the household was able to fulfill. A low value 
means that the household is severely constrained.   
We construct two different samples from the LSMS samples. The first one is a merged 
sample using the 2002, 2003 and 2004 waves, each household being tracked over time. We 
then get an unbalanced sample of 5539 observations, with respectively 1889 households in 
2002, 1842 in 2003 and 1808 in 2004. The main use of this sample is to study the receipt of 
transfers from all family members living outside Albania. As we have repeated information 
over time for these households, we will be able to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
household level through the use of fixed effects. For these households, the survey provides 
detailed characteristics  on their demographic and socio-economic situation, including age, 
marital status, number of persons in the household, education, health status, position on the 
labor market, religion and living in an urban area among others. 
Our second sample focuses more closely on adult children and concerns the 2003 wave. 
Indeed, the LSMS survey includes in 2003 a set of detailed questions on all the adult children 
of the head, either living in Albania or living in abroad. As we have also information about 
their potential transfers made to the household, we choose to construct a matched sample 
where  each  child  (whatever  the  geographic  location)  is  counted  as  one  observation. This 
means that for a head with three adult children, our sample includes three child-parent pairs. 
This sample includes 2396 adult children, 1056 of them living in a foreign country. The main 
interest of this sample is to shed light on the intra-household allocation of transfers, since it 
indicates who is remitting within the sibship. Also, we are able to control for both the parent 
and the child characteristics in our regressions. For each of the different adult children, we 
have information about gender, age, marital status, level of education, whether they migrate 
with family in foreign countries, whether they live in Albania and whether they have sent 
money to the household. 
                                                            
40 Note that this information about potential constraints is only in the 2003 and 2004 questionnaires.  
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2.1.3. The pattern of remittances in Albania 
We begin with a description of the pattern of remittances in Albania. The LSMS survey 
allows us to explore some basic questions about the characteristics of donors and recipients. 
Who remits? Who receives? Where do the remitting persons live? How much is remitted? 
What is the main use of these remittances? In our empirical analysis, we make a difference 
between  remittances  from  all  persons  (using  the  2002-2003-2004  merged  sample)  and 
remittances from adult children (using the 2003 parent-child samples). 
Let us first focus on the transfer rate. More than one household over four has benefited 
from remittances over the last three years, the average proportion of recipients being equal to 
27.6%. Note however that there are large differences over time. The transfer rate is similar in 
2002 and 2004, respectively 23.3% and 24.2%, but it amounts to 35.1% in 2003. This is 
puzzling as there is no particular economic shock over the period, but recall that there are 
significant differences in the labeling of the questions measuring transfers in the survey. Both 
in 2002 and 2004, the head of the household is asked about any transfers received from other 
people (and has then to say whether the transfer has been made by a child, a parent, a sibling, 
etc), while in 2003 there are several questions indicating the receipt of a transfer for each 
category of potential senders (children, siblings, uncles, etc.). So, our results show that the 
measurement of remittances is highly sensitive to the design of the questionnaires. 
As shown in Table 2.1, the bulk of remittances is made by adult children to the head of the 
household. Among all transfers made the proportion of transfers sent by children amounts to 
62.6% in 2002, 59.7% in 2003 and even 74.9% in 2004. Remittances are also frequently made 
by siblings, about one transfer over four
41. In Figure 1, we calculate the distribution of the 
total value of remittances by type of donor. Again, we note that much of the money is sent by 
adult children, around 53% of the total amounts in 2002 and 77% in 2004. Much money was 
sent by siblings in 2002 (about 30% of the total value) than in 2004 (about 10%). 
                                                            
41 An interesting result of Table 2.1 is that in 2003, the proportion of transfers made by other family members is 
much higher than in 2002 and 2004 (respectively 10.8% instead of 2.3% and 1.5%). As previously discussed, 
this difference stems from the fact that there are more detailed questions on other family senders in 2003.  
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  Source: LSMS Albania 2002, 2004. 
 
 
We then perform the same calculations by location of donor using the 2002 and 2004 
waves, the origin of the transfers made by all family members being not available in 2003. We 
evidence a very similar pattern for both years. Among all transfers made, about 42% of them 
come from Greece, 40% from Italy, 10% from other European countries and the rest from 
other  countries  (mainly  from  the  United  States).  When  considering  the  distribution  of 
amounts, Figure 2 shows that Greece is the main origin of remittances to Albania in 2002 
(about 40% of the total value), but Italy becomes in 2004 the first country (about 45% of the 
total value). We also describe in Figure 2 the origin of the total amount of remittances from 
adult children using the 2003 wave. More than 70% of the remittances come from Greece and 
Italy, and more than 20% of these flows are sent by adult children living in other European 
countries.  
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  Source: LSMS Albania 2002, 2003, 2004. 
 
Another useful information in the 2002 and 2003 questionnaires is related to the main uses 
of remittances by the recipient households. Answers have to be interpreted with caution as 
this is a self-reported information, but this gives some preliminary indications on the transfer 
motives. For instance, remittances related to basic necessities would be more in accordance 
with an altruistic explanation. In Figure 3, we first describe the proportion of transfers for the 
main uses described in the survey. When considering all transfers (2002 wave), we find that 
58% of the remittances are claimed to supply for food and basic necessities, less than 20% are 
related to investment, and about 15% to medical expenses.  
There are some differences when focusing on transfers made by non-coresident children 
only (2003 wave). Although most of the transfers are still related to food and basic necessities 
(more than 60%), we note that there are more remittances from children related to investment. 
Figure 4 indicates the distribution of the total amount of remittances by use of transfer. The 
main result is that among adult children, remittances are much higher on average when they 
serve an investment purpose. They represent about 20% of all transfers made in frequency, 
but they amount to about 50% of all the money transferred.   
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  Source: LSMS Albania 2002, 2003.   
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So, these descriptive results suggest that there are both altruistic and exchange motivated 
transfers among Albanian households. On the one hand, all the remittances related to basic 
necessities  are  much  more  consistent  with  altruism,  in  the  sense  that  they  will  alleviate 
poverty  and  depend  on  the  financial  situation  of  the  recipient.  On  the  other  hand,  large 
transfers which are invested by the recipients may be part of a family contract strategy or may 
be a loan repayment.  
Finally, we describe the selected samples to study the pattern of remittances in Albania. In 
Table  2.1,  we  report  the  household’s  characteristics  depending  on  whether  they  receive  a 
transfer from abroad or not. On average, recipients are slightly older than non-recipients (53 
years  old  instead  of  50  in  2002),  they  live  less  frequently  in  couple,  and  their  level  of 
education  is  on  average  lower.  For  instance,  29.5%  of  the  recipients  have  not  completed 
primary school in 2002, while the same proportion is 21.6% among non-recipients. Recipients 
are  also  less  likely  to  have  a  paid  work,  respectively  55.1%  instead  of  63.6%  in  2002
42. 
Another result is that recipient households are poorer on average. Using the 2002 wave, we 
note that the household’s income of the recipients is 14.2% lower than that of non-recipients. 
Finally, we observe significant differences by religion and location. Recipients are less often 
Muslim and they live less frequently in an urban area.  
                                                            
42 Very similar results are observed in 2003 and 2004 for the educational level and job status. For instance, the 
proportion of heads not having a job is 54.3% among recipients instead of 65.2% among non-recipients in 2004. 
A difference between the 2002 and 2003/2004 waves is related to health. Both in 2003 and 2004, recipients are 
more likely to be in poor health than non-recipients (respectively 16.5% instead of 12.5% in 2003, and 16.7% 
instead of 11.8% in 2004).    
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Table 2.1. Description of the samples 
 
Variables  2002  2003  2004  All 
No transfer  Transfer  No transfer  Transfer  No transfer  Transfer 
Household’s characteristics               
Head’s age  49.902  53.045  50.078  54.490  51.548  55.927  51.619 
Head’s in couple  0.865  0.830  0.842  0.836  0.828  0.799  0.840 
Number of persons in the household  4.549  4.442  4.489  3.853  4.565  3.710  4.383 
Education  Incomplete primary  0.216  0.295  0.199  0.300  0.208  0.310  0.234 
    Complete primary  0.365  0.381  0.383  0.352  0.369  0.386  0.371 
    Secondary school  0.126  0.104  0.123  0.118  0.127  0.110  0.122 
    Vocational  0.178  0.150  0.180  0.141  0.175  0.139  0.168 
    University  0.115  0.070  0.116  0.088  0.121  0.055  0.105 
Head in poor health  0.140  0.145  0.125  0.165  0.118  0.167  0.137 
Head has a paid work  0.636  0.551  0.642  0.610  0.652  0.543  0.624 
Household income in 2002 (log)  9.529  9.387  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Muslim  0.776  0.705  0.784  0.725  0.774  0.735  0.762 
Urban area  0.517  0.483  0.531  0.460  0.532  0.427  0.507 
Remittances               
Mean value of remittances  0.0  177200  0.0  n.a  0.0  112400   
Median value of remittances  0.0  100000  0.0  n.a.  0.0  80000   
Donor    Spouse  -  4.9  -  n.a.  -  7.6  - 
    Children  -  62.6  -  59.7  -  74.9  - 
    Grandchildren  -  5.8  -  2.3  -  1.2  - 
    Siblings  -  24.4  -  27.3  -  14.9  - 
    Other family  -  2.3  -  10.8  -  1.5  - 
Source country  Greece  -  42.7  -  n.a.  -  41.9  - 
    Italy  -  40.0  -  n.a.  -  39.2  - 
    Other Europe  -  9.6  -  n.a.  -  12.7  - 
    Other countries  -  7.7  -  n.a.  -  6.1  - 
Number of observations  1448  441  1183  659  1370  438  5539 
Proportion of donors  0.233  0.351  0.242  0.276 
Source: LSMS Albania 2002, 2003 and 2004.  n.a. means that the information is not available. 
 
 
We now turn to the sample of non-coresident children in 2003, described in Table 2.2. The 
proportion  of  children  living  in  Albania  is  55.9%  (1340/2396).  There  are  significant 
differences in characteristics between children depending on their location. For instance, the 
proportion of daughters living in Albania is 64.2%, but 63.4% of emigrant children are sons. 
Emigrants are much younger than children living in Albania: 52.6% of the latter are above 35 
years old, while the same proportion is only 30.2% among those who have migrated. Children 
living outside Albania are more educated on average
43. Finally, 12% of children living in 
Albania have ever migrated and returned. 
                                                            
43 The proportion of children having completed more than primary education is equal to 51.2% among those who 
live outside, but 41.8% among those who live in Albania.  
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Table 2.2. Description of the 2003 sample of non-coresident children 
 
Variables  Children living in 
Albania 
Children living outside Albania 
No remittances  Remittances  All 
Child’s characteristics         
Sex    Male  35.8  50.5  73.9  63.4 
    Female  64.2  49.5  26.1  36.6 
Age    Less than 26  12.8  32.7  28.8  30.6 
    26-35  34.6  35.0  42.7  39.2 
    36-45  32.2  21.8  21.1  21.4 
    More than 45  20.4  10.5  7.4  8.8 
Education  Primary school  58.2  42.1  54.2  48.8 
    Secondary school  20.3  30.6  25.7  27.9 
    Vocational  12.2  13.8  14.0  13.9 
    University  9.3  13.4  6.0  9.4 
Country    Albania  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Greece  0.0  40.0  44.0  42.2 
    Italy  0.0  36.5  35.2  35.8 
    Other Europe  0.0  16.4  15.2  15.7 
    Other countries  0.0  7.1  5.5  6.3 
Ever migrated and returned (%)  12.0  -  -  - 
Age when leaving parental home  23.2  23.3  23.6  23.4 
Number of years since moving abroad  -  5.0  5.4  5.2 
Lives with a spouse abroad (%)    0.0  76.3  60.1  67.4 
Lives with children abroad (%)  0.0  62.7  49.6  55.5 
Remittances         
Donor (%)  -  0.0  100.0  54.8 
Mean value of remittances  -  0.0  131500  72100 
Median value of remittances  -  0.0  50000  10000 
Number of observations  1340  477  579  1056 
Source: LSMS Albania 2003. 
 
When comparing remitters and non-remitters, we find that the proportion of men is much 
larger in the former group than in the latter (73.9% instead of 50.5%). Remitters are slightly 
older, 43% of them between 26-35 years old compared to 35% among non-remitters. Children 
sending money are more likely to have completed only primary school, while high educated 
children  make  less  often  remittances. Two  other  interesting  results  concern  the  migration 
profile. On the one hand, the average number of years since migration is roughly the same for 
the two groups of adult children (about five years). On the other hand, children who send 
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2.1.4. The motives for remittances 
A. The role of the recipients’ characteristics   
As the theoretical models of transfers lead to specific predictions concerning the role of 
explanatory variables like education or income (see Rapoport and Docquier, 2006), we first 
focus on the characteristics of the households who benefit from remittances. We begin with a 
cross-sectional econometric analysis using the 2002 wave, as there is an accurate measure of 
the household’s income only in 2002. 
Let 
*
02 , i T  be a latent variable measuring the propensity for a household  i to receive a 
transfer in 2002. This indicator 
*
02 , i T  is expected to depend on a set of characteristics  02 , i X , a 
vector of coefficients  02 b  and a residual  02 , i e , so that  02 , 02 ,
*
02 , ' i i i X T e b + = . By definition, we 
do  not  observe  the  latent  transfer  variable 
*
02 , i T ,  but  the  data  provide  information  on  the 
observed counterpart  02 , i T . We have  1 02 , = i T  when  0
*
02 , > i T  and  0 02 , = i T  otherwise. Assuming 
that the residual is normally distributed, the corresponding specification is a simple Probit 
model and we have  ) ' ( ) 1 Pr( 02 , 02 , i i X T b F = = , where  (.) F  is the standard normal distribution. 
A second indicator for the transfer is given by its amount, which is equal to 0 when the child 
does not receive a transfer, and the econometric model is then a Tobit one. 
Both the Probit and Tobit estimates for the 2002 wave are reported in Panel A of Table 2.3. 
The different covariates introduced in the regression are related to the head and concern age, 
marital status, level of education, number of persons in the household, poor health, job status, 
household income, religion (being Muslim) and living in an urban area. It is important to note 
here that  we  are not  able to control for the characteristics of the potential donors. When 
considering the probability of receiving money, we find that it is positively correlated with the 
age of the respondent. As older people usually need more support and have less resource, this 
could be the sign of altruism. Another explanation is that older respondents are more likely to 
have adult children living abroad, and these children are the main providers of remittances in 
Albania.  
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Table 2.3. Determinants of remittances 
 
A. Wave 2002 
 




  Coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.) 
Constant  -0.430  (1.51)  -6.647  (1.58) 
Household’s characteristics (recipient)         
Head’s age  0.008***  (2.70)  0.114***  (2.73) 
Head’s in couple  -0.025  (0.25)  -0.280  (0.20) 
Number of persons in the household  -0.017  (0.93)  -0.191  (0.71) 
Education  Complete primary  -0.030  (0.32)  -0.299  (0.22) 
(Ref: Incomplete)  Secondary school  -0.157  (1.21)  -1.913  (1.01) 
    Vocational  -0.183  (1.59)  -2.668  (1.59) 
    University  -0.389***  (2.78)  -5.548***  (2.70) 
Head in poor health  -0.220**  (2.17)  -3.271**  (2.21) 
Head has a paid work  -0.133*  (1.67)  -2.024*  (1.74) 
Household income in 2002 (log)  -0.019  (0.91)  -0.279  (0.90) 
Muslim  -0.243***  (3.27)  -3.402***  (3.13) 
Urban area  -0.049  (0.65)  -0.907  (0.82) 
Number of observations  1882  1882 
Log likelihood  -996.8  -2428.6 
 
 
B. Waves 2002, 2003 and 2004 
 
Variables  (1) 
Random effects Probit model 
(2) 
Fixed effects Logit model 
  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.) 
Constant  -0.630**  (2.57)     
Household’s characteristics (recipient)         
Head’s age  0.013***  (4.46)  0.026  (0.53) 
Head’s in couple  0.263***  (2.81)  0.505  (1.60) 
Number of persons in the household  -0.147***  (8.03)  -0.167**  (2.45) 
Education  Complete primary  -0.109  (1.08)     
(Ref: Incomplete)  Secondary school  -0.162  (1.21)     
    Vocational  -0.288**  (2.39)     
    University  -0.597***  (4.18)     
Head in poor health  -0.019  (0.23)  0.195  (1.10) 
Head has a paid work  -0.082  (1.17)  -0.089  (0.54) 
Muslim  -0.213***  (2.68)     
Urban area  -0.254***  (3.36)     
Number of observations  5538  2105 
Number of families  1889  705 
Log likelihood  -2911.9  -765.3 
         Source: LSMS Albania 2002, 2003, 2004. 
         Note: Significance levels are respectively 1% (
***), 5% (
**) and 10% (
*). 
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Being married does not influence the probability to receive money. The coefficient is also 
insignificant for the number of persons
44. While the different educational dummies have a 
negative influence, the estimate becomes significant only for the University grade. That high 
educated  respondents  benefit  less  frequently  from  remittances  casts  doubt  on  the  loan 
repayment hypothesis. According to that motive, high educated individuals are more able to 
enforce loan repayment and thus they should receive more money. Furthermore, the migration 
costs are more likely to be supported by high educated family members staying in Albania. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the migration costs remain low in Albania, as the main 
countries of destination are Greece and Italy. 
As shown in Table 2.3, the probability to be helped is lower when the donor has a paid 
job, although this effect is only significant at the 10 percent level. As this means that the head 
benefits from a regular source of resources, then this result is more consistent with altruism.  
It should be noted that a negative effect of the household’s income on the transfer receipt is 
expected under that motive. Unfortunately, this is not really the case with the LSMS data. 
Although we evidence a negative relationship between the transfer value and the recipient’s 
income, the corresponding estimate is absolutely not significant at any conventional level. So, 
it cannot be claimed that the donors strongly account for the recipient’s economic situation 
before sending money. Another result against the altruistic explanation is that the transfer is 
reduced when the head is in poor health
45. Finally, Muslim respondents are less likely to 
benefit from remittances, while there is no difference between households living in rural and 
urban locations. 
As we have repeated information on both transfers and household’s characteristics (2002, 
2003, 2004), we are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level. The 
model we estimate may be expressed as  t i i t i t i X T , ,
*
, ' e d b + + = , where  i and  t as subscripts 
indicate  respectively  the  respondent  and  the  year  of  survey,  and  i d   is  an  unobserved 
individual effect. These perturbations are supposed to be normally distributed, with mean  0 
and variance 
2
d s , and the error terms  t i, e  are also supposed to be normally distributed with 
                                                            
44 A difficulty here is that we do not have exact information on the number of other family members living 
abroad. On the one hand, altruistic transfers should increase with the number of persons living in Albania. On the 
other hand, when there are more people living in the household, this may also indicate that few family members 
have migrated, which reduces the opportunity to receive some money from abroad. 
45 Note that we get very similar effects of the different covariates both on the probability to receive a transfer and 
on the amount of remittances.   
  50 
unitary  variance.  Under  the  assumption  that  the  covariates  are  uncorrelated  with  the 
individual  effects,  the  corresponding  model  is  a  random  effects  Probit  model  which  is 
estimated using Gaussian quadrature techniques (Butler and Moffitt, 1982).   
As shown in Panel B of Table 2.3 (column 1), we find that the probability of receipt is an 
increasing function of the head’s age. Transfers are also more likely when the head lives in 
couple and when there are few persons living in the household. Note that these covariates 
were not significant when considering the 2002 wave only. At the same time, being in poor 
health and having a job are no longer significant in the regression. In fact, the main result of 
interest for the motivation analysis is that high educated respondents are less likely to receive 
transfers from abroad, which is against the loan repayment hypothesis. The difficulty here is 
that  we  are  not  able  to  add  the  household’s  income  in  the  list  of  covariates  here,  which 
prevents us from testing the relevance of the altruistic model. Our estimates just show that 
transfers are less likely to be received by respondents living in urban area. The standard of 
living is usually lower in rural areas. 
As a final step, we allow for the possibility that the individual unobserved effects are 
correlated with the different covariates. The appropriate specification is the fixed effect Logit 
model described in Chamberlain (1980). The sample is then restricted to respondents who 
have  received  a  transfer  during  at  least  one  year,  but  not  over  the  whole  period. All  the 
characteristics of the respondent that do not vary over time (like education or religion) are 
dropped from the regression. The sample is then restricted to 705 respondents. As shown in 
Panel B of Table 2.3 (column 3), we find that the number of persons living in the household 
has a negative effect on the probability of being helped, while the other covariates are not 
significant. This casts doubt on an altruistic motive as the donor should take into account the 
situation of the recipient, meaning that remittances should depend on health and job status for 
instance.  
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B. Who is sending remittances among children? 
  In the above regressions, we were only able to control for the characteristics of the 
recipients  of  the  transfers  as  we  had  no  description  of  the  different  donors  in  the  LSMS 
survey. This is undoubtedly a shortcoming as the transfer is expected to depend on both the 
donor and the recipient’s characteristics under either altruism or exchange.
46 In what follows, 
we restrict our attention to the different transfers made by adult children to their parents in 
2003 using a matched parent-child sample.   
As we have several children in many families, note that we are now able to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the family level. We denote respectively by  j  and ias subscripts 
the child and the parent. Drawing on a latent variable specification, the probability for a child 
to send money is expressed as  i j i i j i j X T , ,
*
, ' e q b + + = , where  i q  is an unobserved family effect 
and  i j, e  a random perturbation. The family fixed effect is expected to pick up all the factors 
related to the parents that have previously influenced the migration of the children. We use the 
following covariates for the children, i.e. sex, age, rank within the sibship, having a spouse or 
children living abroad, level of education and duration of the migration. The selected parental 
characteristics are age, marital situation, number of adult children living outside, number of 
persons  in  the  household,  level  of  education,  being  in  poor  health,  having  a  paid  work, 
religion and rural-urban status. 
  Assuming that the family fixed effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, 
the appropriate specification is a random effects Probit model. The sample comprises 1056 
parent-child pairs (585 families) and the corresponding estimates are reported in column 1 of 
Table 2.4. Daughters living abroad are less likely to remit than sons (at the 1 percent level). 
The probability of making a transfer is an increasing function of the donor’s age. Younger 
children are presumably less able to send money because of a less secure situation in the 
labor-receiving country. This would be consistent with the fact that the likelihood of remitting 
is also increasing with the duration of migration. Another interpretation of this result is that 
Albanian migrants keep a strong attachment to their country of origin. 
                                                            
46 For instance, controlling only for the recipient’s level of education without having information on the donor’s 
socio-economic status is likely to lead to biased results. See the further discussion in Altonji et al. (1997).  
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Table 2.4. Determinants of remittances from adult children in 2003 
 
Variables  (1) 
Random effects Probit 
model 
(2) 





  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.) 
Constant  0.684  (0.86)  9.404
***  (4.18)     
Child’s characteristics (donor)             
Female  -0.720
***  (4.94)  -3.571
***  (7.69)  -1.780
***  (4.72) 
Age  0.045
**  (2.54)  0.138
***  (2.61)  0.128
*  (1.84) 
Rank within the sibship  0.150
**  (2.27)  0.429
**  (2.01)  0.336  (1.55) 
Lives with a spouse abroad  -0.721
***  (3.48)  -2.477
***  (3.83)  -0.690  (1.35) 
Lives with children abroad  -0.354
*  (1.79)  -1.788
***  (2.85)  -1.485
***  (2.80) 
Education  Secondary school  -0.302
*  (1.82)  -1.217
**  (2.31)  -0.896
*  (1.87) 
(Ref: Primary)  Vocational  -0.272  (1.40)  -0.754  (1.22)  -0.800  (1.58) 
    University  -0.616
**  (2.29)  -2.251
***  (2.60)  -1.168  (1.42) 
Duration of the migration  0.070
***  (3.35)  0.305
***  (4.83)  0.142
**  (2.46) 
Household’s characteristics (recipient)             
Head’s age  -0.013  (0.87)  -0.064  (1.45)     
Head’s in couple  0.152  (0.68)  0.383  (0.61)     
Number of adult children living outside  -0.091  (1.48)  -0.105  (0.58)     
Number of persons in the household  -0.052  (1.06)  -0.199  (1.42)     
Education  Complete primary  0.230  (1.10)  0.666  (1.15)     
(Ref: Incomplete)  Secondary school  0.519  (1.49)  1.883
*  (1.89)     
    Vocational  0.066  (0.24)  0.377  (0.48)     
    University  -0.288  (0.85)  -1.039  (1.08)     
Head in poor health  0.090  (0.44)  0.092  (0.16)     
Head has a paid work  -0.102  (0.49)  -0.684  (1.16)     
Household income in 2002 (log)  -0.720  (1.09)  -3.256
*  (1.71)     
Muslim  -0.104  (0.57)  -0.135  (0.26)     
Urban area  -0.515
***  (2.67)  -1.449
***  (2.64)     
Number of observations  1056  1056  359 
Number of families  585  585  118 
Log likelihood  -620.0  -2555.9  -84.3 
    Source: LSMS Albania 2003. 
    Note: Significance levels are respectively 1% (
***), 5% (
**) and 10% (
*).  
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An important covariate in our context is education.   According to our estimates, high 
educated children (especially when they have studied at University) are less likely to send 
money to their parents. According to the loan repayment motive, migrants are considered as 
borrowers  and  they  have  to  send  money  to  reimburse  their  family  who  has  supported 
emigration costs and investment in human capital. A positive correlation between remittances 
and the migrant's education level is thus expected, meaning that the negative effect of the 
donor’s education evidenced in Albania allows us to rule out that motivation. A last finding is 
the lower probability of remittances for the children who live either with their spouse or with 
their children in the labor-receiving country. Such migrants are clearly less likely to return to 
their country of origin and they have also fewer resources to send to their parents. 
A striking feature is that the characteristics of the parents hardly affect the probability of 
receiving money. However, with respect to the results discussed before in Table 2.3, it should 
be  noted  that  we  now  only  focus  on  the  transfers  made  by  children  to  their  parents.
47 
According to Table 2.4, we find that parents living in a urban area are less likely to receive 
remittances. This could be evidence of altruistically motivated transfers, as poverty is mainly 
rural Albania. As we do have a  good measure  of the respondent’s resources in 2003, we 
control for the level of household income in 2002 in the regression. While the corresponding 
coefficient is not significant with the Probit specification, we evidence a negative correlation 
between  the  amount  of  transfers  and  the  recipient’s  income  when  estimating  the  random 
effects Tobit model (column 2, Table 2.4).  
That less well-off parents receive more money from abroad is a priori more consistent 
with altruism than with exchange. Nevertheless, if children were really taking into account the 
well-being of their parents, then they should allow send more money to their parents when the 
latter do not have a job or are in poor health. This is clearly not the case according to the 
Albanian data, which suggests that children are not so strongly altruistic. At the same time, 
because they live in a distant country, it could be that the children have only an imperfect 
knowledge of the economic situation of their parents. 
As a final step, we estimate a fixed effects Logit model. It indicates the probability that a 
child  sends  money  to  the  parent  among  families  in  which  at  least  one  adult  child  living 
                                                            
47 The use of matched samples remains scarce in the literature on remittances, an interesting exception being 
Osili (2007). As we introduce both the characteristics of the child and the parent in the regression, we have also 
estimated the random effects Probit model  with the parental variables only. Again,  we do not find that the 
characteristics of the parent influence the receipt of a transfer.   
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abroad, but not all, makes a transfer. The number of observations is hence reduced to 359 (118 
families), and parental characteristics are no longer included as they do not vary among the 
children of a given sibship. The corresponding estimates are in column 3 of Table 4. With 
respect  to  the  random  effects  specification,  we  find  very  similar  results  although  a  few 
covariates are no longer significant.
48 The main effects are that the probability of sending 
money is higher for daughters than for sons, it is reduced when the migrant child lives with 
children  abroad  and  it  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  time  spent  in  the  labor-receiving 
country. Also, we still evidence a negative correlation between remittances and education, but 
the relationship is hardly significant at conventional level. 
 
2.1.5. Conclusion 
To summarize, our different results from panel data and parent-child matched samples do 
not provide unambiguous evidence in favor of a specific motive of remittances in Albania. 
The main conclusion is that our estimates are here not consistent with the loan repayment 
model, but it remains much more difficult to claim that remittances are either altruistically or 
exchange  motivated  in  Albania.  This  stems  from  several  difficulties  pointed  out  in  the 
remittances  literature  (Rapoport  and  Docquier,  2006).  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  uneasy  to 
discriminate  between  competing  theories  of  remittances  as  different  models  may  be 
characterized by similar predictions. On the other hand, there may be some heterogeneity in 
the  transfer  motives  within  the  population.  Some  migrants  may  send  money  because  of 
altruism while the transfers from other migrants are part of an exchange, and a given migrant 
may have several motivations depending on who is the recipient.
49 
It is finally interesting to compare these findings with our previous estimates derived from 
macroeconomic data, which were in favor of the loan repayment hypothesis. While it could be 
argued there that both the macroeconomic and microeconomic estimates are not consistent, 
this is definitely not the case since we have considered two different countries, respectively 
Romania and Albania. For the sake of robustness, we have attempted to conduct an additional 
macroeconomic analysis for Albania using bilateral data collected for 2006, following exactly 
the same methodology. All the details and estimates are described in Duval (2009, appendix 
                                                            
48 But recall that the number of observations is strongly reduced when estimating the conditional Logit model. 
49 For instance, a migrant may send money to poor parents because of altruistic considerations and to siblings as 
part of an exchange if the latter supervise the various investments made by the migrant in his country of origin.  
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1.2, pp. 58-62). Contrary to the situation observed in Romania, the amount of remittances is 
negatively correlated with the level of education of the migrants (at the 10 percent level), 
while  the  coefficient  associated  to  distance  is  positive.  An  additional  conclusion  of  our 
empirical analysis is thus that localization matters, migrants from Romania and Albania being 
characterized by different transfer motivations. 
 
2.2. Remittances and financial situation 
 
2.2.1. The effect of remittances on the recipient’s financial situation 
 
Since  we  cannot  really  understand  the  motives  of  migrants  who  send  money  to  their 
family, we now focus on the impact of these transfers on the recipients. Note that this issue is 
not so disconnected from the motivation analysis. For instance, under altruism, one would 
expect that transfers strongly improve the economic situation of the recipients (especially as 
they should be in a needy position). Conversely, under exchange, transfers should primarily 
be invested and only part of the transfers should benefit the Albanian recipients. 
Our analysis is based on three indicators related to the subjective financial satisfaction, the 
adequateness of the current level of food consumption, and expenditures the household can 
afford to. We describe in Figure 5 the relationship between these indicators and the receipt of 
a transfer. We first consider all the transfers received by the households over the 2002-2004 
period (Panel A). The proportion of respondents being not satisfied at all amounts to 39% 
among the non-recipients, while it is equal to 32% among those who have benefited from 
remittances. At  the  same  time,  those  who  have  received  a  transfer  are  more  likely  to  be 
satisfied (17% instead of 13%). In a similar way, recipients claim more often that their level 
of  consumption  is  just or  more  than  adequate  than  non-recipients  (64%  instead  of  56%). 
Finally, those who receive remittances are less likely to be liquidity constrained. 
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Figure 5. Receipt of remittances and financial situation 
 
 
A. All remittances (2002, 2003, 2004) 
 









































B. Remittances from adult children (2003) 
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Very similar results hold when focusing on the transfers made by adult children using the 
2003 wave (Panel B, Figure 4). For the various economic indicators, we find that respondents 
are in a better financial position when receiving remittances and the improvement of their 
situation is significant. For instance, 36% of the respondents who are not financially helped 
by  their  migrant  children  claim  that  their  current  level  of  food  consumption  is  less  than 
adequate,  while  the  proportion  is  27%  among  those  who  receive  remittances.  Albeit 
preliminary, these findings suggest that transfers bring a large contribution to the recipients’ 
situation. We further investigate this issue using an econometric analysis. 
 
A. Transfers from all migrants 
We focus here on the various remittances sent by all migrants to the respondents and study 
the determinants of the financial situation using the longitudinal data over the period 2002-
2004. To explain the various outcomes, we introduce the following characteristics related to 
the  respondent,  i.e.  gender,  age,  marital  status,  number  of  persons  in  the  household, 
educational attainment, health status, having a job, religion and rural-urban status. We also 
introduce  in  the  regression  a  dummy  variable  which  is  equal  to  1  when  the  respondent 
receives a transfer from abroad and to 0 otherwise. As our different indicators of financial 
situation are given by ordered variables, we turn to random effect ordered Probit models as 
we have repeated information over time for each respondent. 
The different results are reported in Panel A of Table 2.5. For the three outcomes, we 
evidence a better financial situation for respondents living in couple, having achieved high 
education, being in good health and having a job. All these results are in accordance with 
expectations.  For  instance,  a  high  level  of  education  is  associated  to  a  higher  level  of 
permanent income, meaning that people should have more resources to devote to their own 
consumption. While the number of persons in the household is negatively correlated with both 
the  satisfaction  with  financial  situation  and  the  adequateness  of  the  current  level  of  food 
consumption, it does not significantly affect the number of expenditures the household can 
afford to. A similar pattern is observed when the respondent lives in an urban area.
50 
                                                            
50 This result may be more surprising as poverty is essentially rural in Albania. An explanation is that in rural 
areas, households may rely on subsistence agricultural activities to fulfill their own needs.  
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Table 2.5. Determinants of financial situation, with exogenous remittances 
 
 
A. Random effect ordered Probit estimates 
 
Characteristics of the head  (1A) 
Satisfaction with financial 
situation 
(2A) 




household can afford to 
  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.) 
Female  0.198*  (1.94)  0.090  (0.90)  0.105  (0.87) 
Age  0.026*  (1.89)  -0.001  (0.09)  0.035**  (2.12) 
Age² (/100)  -0.007  (0.57)  0.015  (1.17)  -0.020  (1.33) 
In couple  0.422***  (4.22)  0.201**  (2.04)  0.231**  (2.01) 
Number of persons in the household  -0.032**  (2.07)  -0.028*  (1.84)  0.026  (1.35) 
Education  Complete primary  0.157*  (1.78)  0.178**  (2.09)  0.164  (1.60) 
(Ref: Incomplete)  Secondary school  0.534***  (4.62)  0.548***  (4.91)  0.779***  (5.79) 
    Vocational  0.540***  (5.18)  0.451***  (4.49)  0.654***  (5.36) 
    University  1.183***  (9.73)  1.143***  (9.73)  1.635***  (11.49) 
Head in poor health  -0.560***  (7.91)  -0.398***  (5.52)  -0.606***  (7.27) 
Head has a paid work  0.407***  (6.92)  0.348***  (5.81)  0.276***  (3.79) 
Muslim  -0.116*  (1.70)  -0.097  (1.48)  -0.167**  (2.11) 
Urban area  -0.172***  (2.68)  -0.216***  (3.47)  0.095  (1.28) 
Receipt of remittances  0.194***  (4.01)  0.254***  (5.09)  0.070  (1.26) 
Log likelihood  -4809.8  -4038.8  -5653.3 
   
 
B. Fixed effect ordered Probit estimates 
 
Characteristics of the head  (1B) 
Satisfaction with financial 
situation 
(2B) 




household can afford to 
  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.) 
Age  0.321**  (2.36)  0.539***  (3.62)  1.849***  (12.56) 
Age² (/100)  -0.145  (1.14)  -0.165  (1.20)  -0.066  (0.48) 
Number of persons in the household  0.103*  (1.92)  -0.040  (0.67)  -0.392***  (6.38) 
Head in poor health  -0.408***  (2.84)  -0.222  (1.45)  -0.523***  (3.71) 
Head has a paid work  0.496***  (3.96)  0.524***  (3.66)  0.465***  (3.87) 
Receipt of remittances  0.215**  (2.20)  0.528***  (4.70)  0.853***  (9.70) 
Source : LSMS Albania 2002, 2003, 2004. 
Note: (1A), (1B) and (1C) are random effect Ordered Probit estimates, (1B), (2B) and (3B) are estimates from fixed effect 







A result of interest for our study is that the receipt of respondents makes respondents more 
satisfied about their current financial situation. The coefficient associated to the transfer is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. A similar result holds for the adequateness of 
the current level of food consumption. However, there is no significant correlation between 
remittances and the number of expenditures the household can afford, although the coefficient 
remains  positive.  That  the  receipt  of  remittances  improves  the  satisfaction  with  current 
financial situation and consumption seems consistent with our results from the motivation 
analysis,  as they suggest that migrants were more likely to support households in a poor 
economic  situation  and  needing  financial  support.  Remittances  dramatically  improve  the 
situation of those left behind, especially as poverty is substantial in Albania. 
As the individual unobserved effects may be correlated with the characteristics of the 
respondents, we have also estimated a fixed effect ordered Probit regression. A difficulty here 
is that there is no direct approach to estimate such model. We thus proceed in the following 
way. Assuming that the ordered financial indicator  F  may take values from 1 to  K , we 
estimate a set of conditional Logit models by grouping adjacent outcomes for the dependent 
variables 
k F  (with  K k ,... 1 = ) such that  1 =
k F  if  k F
k >  and  0 =
k F  otherwise. For each 
k F , we get a consistent estimate 
k b  of b  using the fixed effects Logit estimator. 
We then rely on a Classical Minimum Distance estimator to get a restricted estimator for 
b  from the various 
k b . Specifically, we solve  ( ) ( ) b J b J d H V H - -
- ˆ ˆ ' ˆ min
1 , where  V ˆ  is a 
weighting positive definite matrix and J  is the unrestricted vector  )' ' ,..., ' (
1 1 - =
K b b J . The 
mapping from J  to  b  is linear, with  b J H = . The solution is  ( ) ( ) J b ˆ ˆ ' ˆ ' ˆ 1 1 1 - - - = V H H V H  and 
the  asymptotic  covariance  matrix  is  given  by  ( ) ( )
1 1 ˆ ' ˆ
- - = H V H V b .  Results  from  the  fixed 
effects ordered Probit model are in Panel B of Table 2.5
51. 
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the role of remittances. For the three financial 
outcomes  under  consideration  (current  income  satisfaction,  consumption  satisfaction  and 
number of expenditures the household can afford to), we get a positive coefficient for the 
transfer dummy. So, our findings suggest that remittances significantly improve the financial 
situation of their recipients. Nevertheless, as shown in Dimova and Wolff (2008), a difficulty 
here  is  that  remittances  are  unlikely  to  be  exogenous.  Indeed,  the  migrant’s  decision  to 
transfer resources to the family living in Albania is itself expected to depend on the recipient’s 
                                                            
51 Again, the education variable is no longer in the regression as it does not vary over time.  
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economic status, meaning that the coefficient associated to the remittances variables in the 
various ordered regressions is likely to be biased under the exogeneity assumption.  
When using the longitudinal sample, we are only able to  control for the respondent’s 
characteristics in the ordered regressions. It thus seems difficult, and even unlikely, to rely on 
an  instrumental  variable  approach  to  correct  the  endogeneity  bias
52.  As  the  receipt  of 
remittances  from  abroad  is  like  a  treatment  (recipients  being  the  treated  group  and  non-
recipients the control  group), we consider an alternative strategy based on the propensity 
score matching estimator as this method is expected to reduce the bias in the estimation of 
treatment effects with observational data sets (see Becker and Ichino, 2002). For that purpose, 
the comparison of outcomes between recipients and non-recipients has to be performed using 
treated and control subjects who are as similar as possible. The pre-treatment characteristics 
of  each  respondent  are  summarized  into  a  single-index  variable,  the  so-called  propensity 
score. The extent to which this bias is reduced depends on the quality of the control variables 
on which the propensity score is computed and the matching performed
53. 
We proceed in the following way with the Albanian data. We first estimate a Probit model 
to explain the probability for each respondent to receive at least one transfer from abroad over 
the  period  2002-2004,  i.e.  the  treatment  T .  The  list  of  covariates  X   introduced  in  the 
regression includes age (with a quadratic profile), marital status, number of persons in the 
household, educational attainment (four dummies), being in poor health, work status, religion 
and urban-rural status. We then compute the propensity score  ) ( ) 1 Pr( X T E X T = = . Finally, 
we estimate the causal effect of the receipt of transfers on the respondent’s financial situation 
using a Kernel matching estimator (Heckman et al., 1998). The average effect of the treatment 
on  the  treated  is  given  by  ) 1 ( 0 1 = - = T F F E ATT ,  1 F   and  0 F   being  the  outcomes  in  the 
situations of respectively treatment (receipt of remittances) and no treatment
54. 
                                                            
52 To implement an IV estimation, one would need a variable strongly correlated with the remittances variable, 
but having no impact on the financial situation of the respondent. 
53 Note that there is no bias when the exposure to treatment can be considered to be purely random among 
respondents  who  have  the  same  value  of  the  propensity  score.  However,  this  does  not  eliminate  the  bias 
generated by unobservable factors. 
54 When implementing the propensity score matching analysis, we check the relevance of the balancing property 
(the means of each explanatory variable should not differ between treated and control units after the matching). 
Results from the various Probit regressions estimated to compute the propensity score are available upon request.  
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We report in Table 2.6 the results of the propensity score analysis for our various financial 
outcomes. Let us focus here on the matching estimates when all remittances over the period 
2002-2004 are taken into account. Under the exogeneity assumption (unmatched estimate), 
we find that the difference in satisfaction with financial situation between the treated and the 
control groups is equal to 0.105, but the ATT estimate amounts to 0.131 and is significant at 
the 1 percent level. Similar results are observed for the adequateness of the level of food 
consumption (the unmachted difference is 0.084 while the ATT estimate is 0.102), and for the 
number of expenditures the household can afford to. The unmatched estimator is equal to 
0.062 and not statistically significant, but it is more than three times higher (0.221) with the 
propensity score matching analysis and significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
Table 2.6. Propensity score estimates of the effect of remittances on financial satisfaction 
 
Outcome  Treated  Controls  Difference  t-test (abs.) 
All remittances (2002-2003-2004)         
Satisfaction with financial situation         
    Unmatched  0.852  0.748  0.105  (5.12) 
    ATT  0.852  0.721  0.131  (6.11) 
Adequate level of food consumption         
    Unmatched  0.680  0.596  0.084  (4.97) 
    ATT  0.680  0.577  0.102  (5.96) 
Expenditures the household can afford to         
    Unmatched  1.954  1.893  0.062  (1.09) 
    ATT  1.954  1.733  0.221  (3.63) 
Remittances from adult children (2003)         
Satisfaction with financial situation         
    Unmatched  0.914  0.804  0.109  (2.63) 
    ATT  0.918  0.796  0.122  (2.66) 
Adequate level of food consumption         
    Unmatched  0.753  0.667  0.086  (2.77) 
    ATT  0.752  0.647  0.106  (3.05) 
Expenditures the household can afford to         
    Unmatched  1.877  1.717  0.160  (1.66) 
    ATT  1.892  1.554  0.338  (3.20) 
Source : LSMS Albania 2002, 2003, 2004. 
Significance levels are respectively 1% (
***), 5% (
**) and 10% (
*).   
 
So, according to the Albanian data, we can argue that remittances have a causal, positive 
effect on the financial position of the recipients. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
propensity  score  matching  analysis  does  not  allow  to  control  for  selection  bias  due  to 
unobservables, meaning that our results have to be interpreted with cautious.   
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B. The case of remittances sent by adult children 
We now extend our investigations to the case of remittances sent by adult children in 
2003, the matched child-parent sample offering some opportunities to apply an IV estimator. 
As a preliminary step, we investigate the household characteristics that influence our three 
financial  indicators  (income  satisfaction,  adequateness  of  consumption  and  possible 
expenditures) using standard ordered Probit models. The different explanatory variables are 
gender, age, marital status, number of persons in the household, level of education, being in 
poor health, having a job, religion and rural-urban status. We also include the exogenous 
receipt of remittances in the various regressions whose results are in Panel A of Table 2.7. 
According  to  the  data,  satisfaction  with  current  financial  situation  is  higher  when  the 
respondent is highly educated, has a job and is in good health. Similar findings holds for the 
adequateness of food consumption and expenditures the household can afford to. Our main 
result is the positive effect of the remittances dummy, which is significant at the 1 percent 
level for the three outcomes. As expected, those who benefit from transfers sent by their adult 
children living abroad are more likely to be in a better off position. Note that this finding was 
expected, given the previous positive effect evidenced for all transfers from abroad and the 
crucial role of children in supporting the Albanian households. 
To control for the potential selection of poorer households in the program (i.e. receipt of 
remittances),  we  first  apply  the  propensity  score  matching  analysis  on  the  parent-child 
sample. When considering the unmatched sample, the differences between the treated and the 
control groups are respectively equal to 0.109 for satisfaction with current financial situation, 
0.086 for adequateness of food consumption and 0.160 for number of potential expenditures 
(see Table 2.6). Once properly matched, the corresponding values for the ATT estimate are 
respectively equal to 0.122, 0.106 and 0.338, all significant at the 1 percent level
55. So, the 
positive impact of transfers on living standard remains once we control for selection due to 
observable characteristics. 
                                                            
55 Note that we get very similar results when considering either all the transfers from abroad or only transfers 
from adult sibling. For instance, the ATT estimate is equal to 0.122 when using the 2003 parent-child sample, 
while it amounts to 0.131 when considering the longitudinal sample with all transfers. The difference is larger 
when considering the number of expenditures the household can afford to, the ATT estimate being higher with 
remittances from adult children.  
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Table 2.7. The impact on remittances from adult children on satisfaction 
 
 
A. With exogenous receipt of remittances 
 
Characteristics of the head  (1A) 
Satisfaction with financial 
situation 
(2A) 




household can afford to 
  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.) 
Female  -0.076  (0.39)  0.107  (0.50)  0.032  (0.15) 
Age  -0.051  (1.37)  -0.036  (0.81)  0.046  (1.26) 
Age² (/100)  0.039  (1.34)  0.036  (1.04)  -0.036  (1.23) 
In couple  0.109  (0.59)  0.360
*  (1.74)  0.140  (0.67) 
Number of persons in the household  -0.021  (0.87)  -0.016  (0.54)  -0.004  (0.18) 
Education  Complete primary  0.066  (0.66)  0.024  (0.22)  0.022  (0.24) 
(Ref: Incomplete)  Secondary school  0.183  (0.96)  -0.075  (0.39)  0.469
***  (2.92) 
    Vocational  0.216
*  (1.91)  0.219  (1.61)  0.150  (1.32) 
    University  0.551
***  (3.42)  0.782
***  (4.14)  0.714
***  (4.66) 
Head in poor health  -0.392
***  (4.14)  -0.358
***  (3.40)  -0.494
***  (5.16) 
Head has a paid work  0.243
***  (2.61)  0.295
***  (2.78)  0.267
***  (2.87) 
Muslim  -0.238
***  (2.89)  -0.132  (1.45)  -0.049  (0.63) 
Urban area  -0.021  (0.24)  -0.149  (1.51)  0.251
***  (2.92) 
Receipt of remittances  0.233
***  (3.13)  0.266
***  (3.24)  0.214
***  (3.17) 
Log likelihood  -986.50  -677.34  -1634.01 
 
 
B. With endogenous receipt of remittances 
 
Characteristics of the head  (1B) 
Satisfaction with financial 
situation 
(2B) 




household can afford to 
  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.)  coef  t-test (abs.) 
Female  -0.066  (0.35)  0.113  (0.53)  0.031  (0.15) 
Age  -0.045  (1.20)  -0.030  (0.67)  0.046  (1.26) 
Age² (/100)  0.034  (1.17)  0.031  (0.88)  -0.035  (1.22) 
In couple  0.104  (0.57)  0.353
*  (1.74)  0.142  (0.70) 
Number of persons in the household  -0.014  (0.59)  -0.010  (0.33)  -0.004  (0.18) 
Education  Complete primary  0.041  (0.41)  0.001  (0.01)  0.019  (0.21) 
(Ref: Incomplete)  Secondary school  0.149  (0.78)  -0.100  (0.53)  0.468
***  (2.92) 
    Vocational  0.224
**  (1.99)  0.227
*  (1.67)  0.151  (1.33) 
    University  0.573
***  (3.47)  0.800
***  (4.20)  0.715
***  (4.67) 
Head in poor health  -0.399
***  (4.22)  -0.364
***  (3.48)  -0.497
***  (5.19) 
Head has a paid work  0.257
***  (2.72)  0.308
***  (2.88)  0.270
***  (2.92) 
Muslim  -0.234
***  (2.85)  -0.128  (1.41)  -0.052  (0.74) 
Urban area  0.042  (0.46)  -0.088  (0.78)  0.252
***  (2.92) 
Receipt of remittances  0.569
**  (2.44)  0.572
**  (2.08)  0.224
***  (3.11) 
Coefficient of correlation  -0.228  (1.49)  -0.207  (1.14)  -0.007  (0.44) 
Log likelihood  -1610.24  -1301.36  -2258.88 
Source: LSMS Albania 2003. 
Note: (1A), (1B) and (1C) are Ordered Probit estimates, (1B), (2B) and (3B) are estimates from a simultaneous model 
comprising one ordered Probit equation for the financial outcome with endogenous receipt of remittances and one Probit 




To assess the robustness of our findings, we finally turn to an IV estimator which allows 
us to control both for observables and unobservables. The idea is as follows. On the one hand, 
the household’s economic situation is expected to depend on the respondent’s characteristics 
and on the transfer variable. On the other hand, the endogenous transfer variable will be 
affected by both the respondent and the donor’s characteristics. So, this means that the child’s 
characteristics will be used as instrumental variables as they will directly impact the decision 
to send money to the parents, while they should not directly affect the household situation 
(but they should have an indirect effect through the transfer). 
To take the potential endogeneity of the transfer variable, we proceed in the following 
way.  We  estimate  a  simultaneous,  recursive  model  which  comprises  one  ordered  Probit 
equation related to the economic outcome of the household and one Probit equation related to 
the  receipt  of  remittances.  The  crucial  issue  here  is  that  we  assume  a  bivariate  normal 
distribution  for  the  residuals  of  each  equation. The  corresponding  log-likelihood  function 
includes terms that are bivariate normally distributed and the model is estimating by a full 
information maximum likelihood method.  Results are in Panel B of Table 2.7.
56 
Once endogeneity is properly taken into account, we still find a positive impact of the 
remittances  variables  on  the  various  economic  indicators  under  considerations.  Both  for 
satisfaction with current situation and adequateness of food consumption, the endogenous 
transfer estimate is now about twice higher than under the exogeneity assumption. However, 
the transfer coefficient in the number of affordable expenditures equation does not really 
change when estimating the recursive specification. In all equations, the receipt of remittances 
is significant at the 1 percent level. So, our different findings using selection techniques both 
on observables and unobservables appear robust and they show that in Albania, remittances 
from adult children have a causal effect on the economic situation of their recipients. 
As they stand, these results provide mixed evidence on the motivation of remittances. That 
the receipt of transfers improves the adequateness of food consumption or the number of 
affordable expenditures indicates that remittances are mostly related to the most basic needs 
of the households living in Albania. A situation where the donors make transfers to poor, 
liquidity constrained recipients is consistent with altruism. At the same time, the numerous 
transfers made by the adult migrant children suggest that they are particularly involved in the 
everyday life of their parents (and more generally of all the family members left in Albania). 
                                                            
56 In our presentation, we only focus on the determinants of the household economic situation. Detailed results of 
the recursive models (included estimates related to the transfer receipt) are available upon request.   
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This could be interpreted as an intention to return home later, especially for those who live 
alone in the labor-receiving country.  
This suggests that the motivations for the children to send money to their parents may be 
part of an exchange, in the sense that the transfers made today to the family will be helpful for 
the donors once being back in Albania. This exchange is definitely not like a loan repayment, 
since the migrants do not strictly reimburse their education and migration costs, which is 
again in accordance with estimates from bilateral data in that  country  (see Duval, 2009). 
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to further test the assumption of exchange-motivated 
transfers. For that purpose, one would need panel data covering a longer period of time, in 
order to get more information on the transfers and on return migration. Also, more detailed 
data are needed to understand how the money from remittances is used by their recipients.  
 
2.2.2. Income expectations: Do remittances matter? 
 
2.2.2.1. Introduction 
Income expectations of households play a central role in many economic fields. They will 
for  instance  influence  decisions  on  consumption,  savings,  portfolio  choice,  labor  supply, 
schooling or fertility. Despite the importance and implications of financial expectations, the 
empirical literature on this issue remains rather scarce, especially in developing and transition 
countries where such information is rarely available. Previous micro-econometric studies on 
income expectations have essentially focused on the two following aspects.  
On the one hand, some papers have investigated how agents were forming their income 
expectations. While it is commonly assumed that income expectations are rational, Das and 
van  Soest  (1999)  focus  on  expectations  formation  by  comparing  expected  and  realized 
changes  in  financial  situation  using  panel  data  on  Dutch  households. They  show  that  the 
hypothesis of rational expectations is rejected in the Netherlands. Nicholson and Souleles 
(2001) also reject the assumption of rational expectations in the United States using data on 
income  expectations  of  medical  students  over  a  25  year  time  period.  On  the  other  hand, 
several studies have examined the impact of income expectations on economic individual 
decisions. In Italy, Guiso et alii (1996) find that expectation of future borrowing constraints 
induces individuals to keep a lower proportion of their wealth in the form of risky assets.   
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In  this  section,  we  use  subjective  information  about  past,  current  and  future  financial 
situation in Albania using longitudinal data to study the dynamics of income changes. Our 
analysis then draws on the two influential contributions of Das and van Soest (1997, 1999), 
whose primary interest was to understand household income growth in the Netherlands using 
subjective information
57. However, with respect to these authors, we focus more closely on 
the role of the composition of household resources  and especially remittances on income 
expectations. In the context of a less developed country where incomes are much lower, it 
seems worthwhile to know more about the influence of past changes in financial situation on 
current expectations and the role of private transfers from abroad.  
For  various  reasons,  the  case  of  Albania  is  a  very  relevant  one.  Indeed,  Albania  is 
characterized by a high uncertainty in terms of income due to the transformation from the 
communist  system  towards  a  market  economy.  The  particularities  of  Albania  are  a 
combination of extreme poverty and lack of job opportunities, with high rate of emigration. In 
that context, remittances are a crucial source of income for households (Mansoor and Quillin, 
2006). These transfers are then expected to strongly influence household expectations, and in 
turn economic decisions like consumption, savings, schooling or fertility among others. To the 
best  of  our  knowledge,  our  analysis  is  the  first  one  to  account  for  the  potential  role  of 
remittances on financial expectations. We also contribute to the scarce existing literature on 
household financial perceptions in developing or eastern countries, in particular Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2002) and Senik (2004) in Russia, Kingdon and Knight (2007) in South Africa and 
Gunatilaka and Knight (2007) in China. 
For our empirical analysis, we use again the Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS 
hereafter) conducted in Albania from 2002 to 2004. The high quality of these longitudinal 
data is unprecedented for this transition country. It includes numerous questions on objective 
covariates like education, religion, employment, migration or remittances, and on subjective 
perceptions of financial situation. In particular, for the three waves, respondents indicate their 
satisfaction with respect to their current situation and also expectations and realized changes 
                                                            
57  Using  the  Dutch  Socio-Economic  panel,  Das  and  van  Soest  (1997,  1999)  provide  estimates  of  expected 
changes in income and estimates of a dynamic panel model on income growth. . Their main results are that i) 
respondents  are  more  likely  to  expect  an  income  decrease  than  an  income  increase,  ii)  realizations  are 
substantially better than expectations, and iii) income change expectations strongly depend on income changes in 
the past. For further evidence on subjective income expectations, see Dominitz and Manski (1997).  
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in financial situation. The LSMS survey offers then a unique opportunity to study dynamic 
aspects of income satisfaction in Albania along with the influence of remittances. 
Using subjective information on income changes requires some explanations as such data 
have  been  subject  to  controversial  debates  among  economists.  Until  recently,  subjective 
questions were rarely used. Many economists were skeptical about the empirical content of 
subjective data, with problems concerning psychological mechanisms, interactions with the 
surveyor,  formulation  of  the  questions  or  difficulty  to  interpret  the  answers  among  other 
things
58.  The  situation  is  really  different  nowadays,  with  a  rapid  growth  in  the  use  of 
subjective data. Furthermore, economists have shown that subjective questions were indeed 
reliable and useful (see for instance Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006, Frey and Stutzer, 2002): 
subjective data explain not only individual decisions, but also choices of public policies. 
To study the dynamics in income changes in Albania using the LSMS data, we proceed in 
the following way. Firstly, we investigate the household characteristics that influence income 
expectations  over  time.  We  focus  in  particular  on  the  receipt  of  remittances  and  on  past 
changes  in  financial  situation  experienced  by  respondents.  In  a  second  step,  we  compare 
realizations  and  expectations  in  financial  situation  to  know  whether Albanian  households 
underestimate or overestimate their future income growth. In so doing, we provide a test of 
the assumption of rational expectations in Albania.  
The use of panel data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual 
level in our econometric analysis. We turn to random effects and fixed effects ordered Probit 
models to explain self-reported financial satisfaction. Our main findings are that financial 
expectations  are  strongly  affected  by  realized  changes  in  the  past  and  that  the  receipt  of 
remittances matters. Those who have benefited from foreign transfers have on average better 
financial  expectations.  Finally,  we  observe  that Albanian  households  tend  to  significantly 
overestimate their future financial situation. 
The remainder of this section 2.2.2 is organized as follows. We first provide background 
on economic and migratory situation in Albania and describe the LSMS data. Second, we 
describe statistics on the current, past and future financial situation of the households. Third, 
we present our econometric strategy and investigate the role of individual characteristics on 
expected changes in financial situation using ordered models. Forth, we compare expectations 
with realizations. Finally, we conclude. 
                                                            
58 On the methodological aspects of using subjective data and their advantages and drawbacks, see Senik (2005).  
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2.2.2.2. LSMS Albanian data and subjective questions 
  The  foreign  transfers  are  expected  to  influence  income  expectations.  To  test  this 
conjecture, we use the LSMS Albanian longitudinal data and focus on the first three waves of 
this panel, from 2002 to 2004 (see Part 2, Section 1, Subsection 2).  
The  sizes  of  the  Albanian  samples  are  respectively  1782  households  in  2002  (7973 
individuals), 2155 households in 2003 (8110 individuals) and 1797 households in 2004 (8025 
individuals). In what follows, we focus on changes over time in subjective information on 
income expectations and remittances at the household level. For that purpose, we construct a 
sample where we follow the head of each household over the three waves. After deleting 
missing values, we finally get a balanced panel comprising 4878 observations for the period 
2002-2004, corresponding to 1626 households.
59 
  Let us now describe in more detail the main questions of interest for our study. In the 
three  waves,  we  rely  on  the  three  following  subjective  questions,  respectively  related  to 
satisfaction with current, past and future financial situation: 
A. ‘How satisfied are you with your current financial situation?’. Possible answers are 
‘fully satisfied’, ‘rather satisfied’, ‘less than satisfied’, ‘not at all satisfied’. 
B. ‘Do you feel that your financial situation in the past 12 months has…?’. Possible 
answers are ‘improved a lot’, ‘somewhat improved’, ‘remained the same’, ‘somewhat 
deteriorated’, ‘deteriorated a lot’.
60 
C.  ‘Do  you  think  that  in  the  next  12  months  your  financial  situation  will  be…?’. 
Possible answers are similar to those of question B.  
  As they stand, these questions are easy to understand for respondents, and they are 
also clear and well formulated. As explained by Das and van Soest (1997, 1999) which use 
very similar questions, respondents have the same concepts in mind while answering to the 
questions A, B, and C. Since these questions have been asked at each wave of the panel, it is 
then possible to study changes in income over time and to compare expectations in one year 
to realizations the next year. Finally, it should  be noted that  we have information on the 
current monthly household income only in 2002. We thus turn to a proxy variable given by 
                                                            
59 We choose to rely on a balanced panel instead of an unbalanced one because we are interested in comparing 
answers given to expectations and realized changes. We thus need information given in t on expectations about 
t+1, and then in t+1 on realization since t.  
60 However, note that the question in 2002 is about realized changes since last three years, while answers are 
about realized changes since last 12 months in 2003 and 2004.  
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the self-reported position of the respondent on a 10-step ladder where on the bottom (step 1) 
stand the poorest people and on the highest step (step 10) stand the rich. 
  Concerning  remittances,  data  are  available  in  the  transfers  and  social  assistance 
module in 2002. Information on transfers includes remittances and transfers of family living 
in Albania. We know who is the donor related to the head of the household (spouse, children, 
siblings, etc.) and also where the donor lives (Albania or Greece, Italy, United States, etc.). 
Transfers are then remittances when the donor lives abroad. Amounts of these flows, both for 
cash and in-kind transfers, are also given. In 2003, information is in the migration module 
which includes an additional subsection about children living away. We have then data on 
transfer receipt (but not on amount of remittances) from all the children, nephews, parents, 
and  siblings.  Finally,  a  module  on  remittances  and  other  incomes  is  again  in  the  2004 
questionnaire, with similar information to 2002.  
  To the best of our knowledge, these detailed subjective questions allow us to study for 
the first time the dynamics of income satisfaction in the context of a developing country and 
to  assess  whether Albanian  households  are  pessimistic  or  optimistic  with  respect  to  their 
expectations in income changes. As we have panel data, we are able to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity  at  the  household  level  through  the  use  of  random  and  fixed  effects  when 
studying income expectations and the role of remittances. 
 
2.2.2.3. Descriptive statistics on income satisfaction 
Let  us  first  describe  the  pattern  of  satisfaction  with  current  financial  situation  among 
Albanian households. According to Table 2.8, we find that around 85% of the respondents feel 
not really satisfied (either ‘less than satisfied’ or ‘not satisfied at all’). This proportion is 
slightly decreasing over the period. It was equal to 86.4% in 2002, 84.7% in 2003 and 83.8% 
in 2004. At the same time, we evidence a change in the intensity of dissatisfaction over the 
period. Among  unsatisfied  respondents,  45.6%  of  them  were  not  at  all  satisfied  in  2002, 
42.5% in 2003, and only 38.5% in 2004. Conversely, the percentage of respondents being 
rather or fully satisfied increases over the three years, from 13.7% in 2002 to 16.2% in 2004. 
A plausible explanation is undoubtedly related to economic growth, as annual GDP growth 
from 3% to 6% between 2002 and 2004 according to the World Bank. 
This pattern seems rather consistent with answers given to realized changes since last 12 
months. Over the period, respondents report more frequently that their financial situation has  
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remained the same. This proportion increases over the period, since it was 46.9% in 2002, but 
56.9% in 2003 and 58.7% in 2004.
61 In 2003 and 2004, around 20% of the respondents claim 
that their situation has been either ‘somewhat improved’ or ‘improved’ a lot since last years. 
At the same time, the percentage of respondents reporting that their situation has deteriorated 
(either  ‘somewhat’  or  ‘a  lot’)  is  slightly  higher,  22.8%  in  2003  and  21.7%  in  2004.  On 
average, the situation has deteriorated a lot for about 7% of respondents. 
 
Table 2.8. Subjective information on current, past and future financial situation 
 
Variables  2002  2003  2004 
T=0  T>0  All  T=0  T>0  All  T=0  T>0  All 
Satisfaction with current financial situation                   
  Fully satisfied  2.3  1.3  2.1  1.6  1.0  1.4  1.1  0.8  1.0 
  Rather satisfied  10.7  14.4  11.6  11.3  18.3  13.8  14.3  18.2  15.2 
  Less than satisfied  46.3  49.5  47.0  47.4  51.0  48.7  51.3  51.8  51.5 
  Not at all satisfied  40.7  34.8  39.4  39.6  29.7  36.0  33.3  29.2  32.3 
Realized change since last 12 months                   
  Improved a lot  2.9  0.8  2.4  1.0  1.4  1.1  0.2  1.6  0.6 
  Somewhat improved  23.5  32.1  25.5  14.7  27.1  19.2  18.2  22.0  19.1 
  Remained the same  46.7  47.6  46.9  59.1  53.1  56.9  58.9  57.8  58.7 
  Somewhat deteriorated  18.5  13.4  17.3  18.1  13.5  16.4  15.0  13.7  14.7 
  Deteriorated a lot  8.5  6.2  8.0  7.2  5.0  6.4  7.7  4.9  7.0 
Expected change in next 12 months                   
  Improved a lot  1.3  1.2  1.3  1.1  0.8  1.0  0.2  0.6  0.3 
  Somewhat improved  30.6  37.8  32.3  26.1  39.8  31.2  22.9  29.9  24.5 
  Remained the same  53.9  51.6  53.3  58.5  50.2  55.4  64.7  60.2  63.6 
  Somewhat deteriorated  10.1  7.3  9.5  9.8  7.2  8.8  7.8  5.7  7.3 
  Deteriorated a lot  4.1  2.1  3.6  4.6  2.0  3.7  4.5  3.6  4.3 
Source: LSMS Albania 2002-2003-2004. 
 
  Finally, we investigate the pattern of expected changes on financial situation in next 
12 months. As shown in Table 2.8, many respondents expect that their financial situation will 
remain unchanged: 53.3% in 2002, 55.4% in 2003 and 63.6% in 2004. This is line with the 
findings of Das and van Soest (1997) in the Netherlands, these authors showing that about 
one-half of the households do not expect any change in terms of current income. In Albania, 
households seem rather optimistic about the future. In 2002 and 2003, more than 30% of them 
believe that their financial situation will be improved, either ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’, but this 
proportion is lower in 2004 (24.8%). For comparison, about 12% of respondents believe that 
their situation will deteriorate in the next 12 months (most often ‘somewhat deteriorated’). 
                                                            
61 In 2002, the question was about realized changes since the last three years. This may be an explanation of the 
differences observed between 2002 and 2003/2004.  
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When introducing remittances into the analysis, results reported in Table 2.8 indicate that 
the receipt of transfers from abroad is positively related with income satisfaction. For the 
various years, respondents are more likely to be ‘rather’ of ‘fully’ satisfied when they benefit 
from remittances: 15.7% instead of 13.0% in 2002, 19.3% instead of 12.9% in 2003, and 19% 
instead of 15.4% in 2004. At the same time, the proportion of respondents being not satisfied 
at all is strongly reduced among recipients.  
As remittances bring additional, not necessarily expected, resources to the households, 
they should also have a positive effect on realized change since last 12 months. The LSMS 
data show that this is indeed the case, since improved realized changes (either ‘somewhat’ or 
‘a lot’) are much more frequent among recipients than among non-recipients: 32.9% instead 
of 26.4% in 2002, 28.5% instead of 15.7% in 2003, 23.6% instead of 18.4% in 2004. Finally, 
we  also  observe  a  positive  correlation  between  the  receipt  of  transfers  and  expectations. 
Respondents who have received money from other family members living in foreign countries 
are on average much more optimistic about their financial situation in the future
62.  
As people having experienced negative shocks over the last year may be more pessimistic 
about  their  future  situation,  we  describe  in Table  2.9  income  expectations  in  the  next  12 
months conditional on realized changes since the last 12 months. According to the data, the 
proportions  of  respondents  claiming  that  their  situation  has  not  changed  over  the  last  12 
months and that their situation will remain the same during the 12 next months are roughly 
similar, respectively 53.7% and 57.4%.  
 
Table 2.9. Expected financial situation conditional on realized change 
 
Self-assessed change since 
last 12 months 
(between t-1 and t) 












Improved a lot  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.0  0.0  1.4 
Somewhat improved  0.2  15.0  7.1  0.2  0.0  22.5 
Remaining the same  0.1  11.4  39.5  2.6  0.2  53.7 
Somewhat deteriorated  0.0  2.2  8.6  4.2  0.7  15.7 
Deteriorated a lot  0.0  0.3  1.8  1.4  3.0  6.6 
Total  0.8  29.4  57.4  8.5  3.9  100.0 
Source: LSMS Albania 2002-2003-2004. 
 
                                                            
62 For instance, in 2004, 30.5% of transfer recipients were expecting their financial situation to improve a lot or 
somewhat in the next 12 months, but this proportion was only equal to 23.1% among non-recipients.  
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A  first  result  is  that  many  households  give  similar  answers  to  realized  and  expected 
changes (62.2%). This means that expectations most often reproduce experienced changes. 
For instance, among those who expect in t their situation not to change in t+1, 68.8% of them 
report  no  change  in  their  financial  situation  between  t-1  and  t.
63 A  second  result  is  that 
respondents  are  rather  confident  about  the  future  with  respect  to  realized  changes. While 
11.6% of them have expectations that  are worse than realized changes, 26% of Albanian 
households have expected changes that are better than realized changes.
64 
These descriptive statistics suggest that expectations on income changes depend on past 
changes  in  income.  Households  having  experienced  an  improvement  of  their  financial 
situation also expect a better situation in the future. Nevertheless, it also matters to control for 
household characteristics in order to better understand the relationship between realized and 
expected income changes. Before turning to the econometric analysis, we now describe the 
different explanatory variables that we will introduce in our regressions. 
  According  to Table  2.10,  there  are  much  more  male  (87.5%)  than  female  (12.5%) 
respondents and the mean number of persons per household is around 4.3. The mean age for 
the head is slightly above 50 years. On average, the head has completed more than 8 years of 
education. Concerning employment status, the proportion of farm workers slightly decreases 
over the period, from 28.7% in 2002 to about 27% in 2003 and 2004. Substantial variations 
are evidenced among the self-employed (9.7% in 2002, 17.5% in 2003, 13.7% in 2004). In the 
sample, respondents are more often of Muslim religion (76.8%) and about one-half of the 
interviewees live in an urban area (51.2%). The self-reported position on the income ladder 
increases over the three-years period time (from 3.7 to 4.2).  
                                                            
63 Among those whose situation is expected to deteriorate a lot in next 12 months, 76.9% of them claim that their 
situation has deteriorated a lot since last 12 months. 
64 Among this group of more optimistic respondents, 11.4% of households report an unchanged satisfaction since 
last year and an expectation of a somewhat improved situation.  
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Table 2.10. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variables  2002  2003  2004 
T=0  T>0  All  T=0  T>0  All  T=0  T>0  All 
Head: Female  0.097  0.219  0.125  0.109  0.154  0.125  0.102  0.199  0.125 
Head: Age  49.998  53.949  50.907  50.532  54.346  51.907  51.653  56.933  52.907 
Nb of persons in the household  4.529  4.324  4.482  4.485  3.840  4.252  4.539  3.642  4.326 
Head: Married  1.357  1.503  1.391  1.363  1.427  1.386  1.376  1.464  1.397 
Head: Years of education  8.856  7.824  8.619  8.942  8.044  8.619  8.898  7.723  8.619 
Head: Non-farm work   0.332  0.217  0.306  0.292  0.247  0.276  0.325  0.194  0.294 
Head: Farm work  0.278  0.318  0.287  0.259  0.288  0.269  0.252  0.329  0.271 
Head: Self-employed  0.111  0.051  0.097  0.188  0.150  0.175  0.151  0.093  0.137 
Muslim  0.784  0.717  0.768  0.791  0.727  0.768  0.781  0.728  0.768 
Urban  0.518  0.495  0.512  0.538  0.466  0.512  0.533  0.446  0.512 
Monthly household income (ln)  9.553  9.415  9.521      -      - 
Position on income ladder  3.726  3.807  3.745  4.039  4.413  4.174  4.177  4.329  4.213 
Receipt of remittances  0.000  1.000  0.230  0.000  1.000  0.360  0.000  1.000  0.237 
Annual amount of remittances (ln)  0.000  11.350  2.611  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Number of observations  1252  374  1626  1040  586  1626  1240  386  1626 
Source: LSMS Albania 2002-2003-2004. 
 
As  shown  in  Table  2.10,  the  proportion  of  households  receiving  remittances  is  much 
higher in 2003 (36%) than in 2002 and 2004 (24%). This is undoubtedly due to the different 
way  of  measuring  remittances  in  the  survey  for  that  year,  with  more  detailed  questions. 
Interestingly, we note some significant differences between recipients and non-recipients. In 
particular,  remittances  are  more  frequently  reported  by  women  and  married  respondents, 
while the reverse pattern holds for education and non-farm workers. This is due to the fact 
that high-educated individuals are more likely to emigrate, which increases the probability for 
the head still living in Albania to be helped. 
 
2.2.2.4. Econometric analysis of expected changes  
We  now  investigate  the  factors  that  influence  expected  changes  in  financial  situation, 
which are measured through the use of an ordered categorical variable. We define by  S  the 
subjective measure of expectations. We have  1 = S  when the financial situation in the next 12 
months  will  be  ‘deteriorated  a  lot’,  2 = S   when  ‘somewhat  deteriorated’,  3 = S   when 
‘remaining the same’,  4 = S  when ‘somewhat improved’ or ‘improved a lot’. We choose to 
group these two outcomes as very few households believe that their situation will improve a 
lot (less than 0.7%).  
We suppose that there exists a latent variable 
* S  associated to these financial expectations. 
Given  the  different  possibilities,  we  assume  that  1
* m £ S   when  1 = S ,  2
*
1 m m £ < S   when  
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2 = S ,  3
*
2 m m £ < S   when  3 = S ,  and 
*
3 S < m   when  4 = S .  The  latent  indicator 
* S   is 
expected to depend on a set of individual characteristics  X , a vector of coefficients  b  and a 
residual. Since we have repeated information (2002, 2003, 2004) on financial expectations for 
each individual, we are able to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level in 
the following way: 
it i it it X S e d b + + = '
*                    (1) 
where i and t as subscripts refer respectively to the respondent and to the year of survey. 
In (1),  i d  is an unobserved individual effect. These perturbations are supposed to be normally 
distributed, with mean  0 and variance 
2
d s . The error terms  it e  are also supposed to follow a 
normal  distribution  with  mean  0  and  unitary  variance.  Under  the  assumption  that  the 
covariates are uncorrelated with the individual effects, the corresponding model is a random 
effects ordered Probit model and the different threshold levels  j m  have to be estimated jointly 
with the vector of coefficients b . 
  The contribution to the likelihood function for an individual  i  observed during the 
three periods can be expressed as: 
( ) i i it j it j i i i d X X S S S d d f b m b m ) ( ) ' ( ) ' ( ) , , Pr( 1 04 03 02 ∫
+¥
¥ - + - F - - F =      (2) 
where  ) ( i d f  is the density of  ) , 0 (
2
i N d s . The likelihood function for the above model 
involves multivariate normal integrals, so that the random effect ordered Probit model has to 
be estimated using numerical approximations and Gaussian quadrature techniques
65. 
  As we have additional information on the observed income and amount of remittances 
only in 2002, we first estimate a standard ordered Probit regression for that year. The sample 
is then restricted to 1434 households and estimates are reported in Table 2.11. The regression 
includes the following characteristics of the head of the household, i.e. gender, age, number of 
persons  in  household,  marital  situation,  years  of  education,  dummy  variables  related  to 
occupation, religion (a dummy when the head is Muslim) and rural-urban status. We also 
control for the log of the monthly household income. 
                                                            
65 See Butler and Moffitt (1982) for further details. As the Albanian panel includes only three waves, note that 
we are not able to estimate a dynamic ordered Probit model as in Das and van Soest (1999).  
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  As  shown  in  column  (1),  there  is  no  difference  between  women  and  men  about 
financial expectations. Marital status and number of persons in the household are also not 
significant in the regression. Age of the head is characterized by a U-shaped profile, with a 
minimum at 45 years. We also account for years of education and evidence a positive impact 
on expectations. Education is highly correlated with permanent wealth, and those with more 
education  undoubtedly  face  more  income  opportunities  in  the  future.  Finally,  Muslim 
households are on average more optimistic about their financial expectations, while living in 
urban areas tend to influence negatively these expectations. This result is a little bit surprising 
as poverty is essentially rural in Albania. 
We now turn to variables related to the economic situation of the head. First, we add three 
controls related to the labor market status, i.e. non-farm work, farm work and self-employed 
(not working being the reference category). While having a farm work does not influence the 
subjective outcome, we find that being self-employed and to a lesser extent non-farm worker 
(at the 10 percent level) make individuals more optimistic about their financial expectations. 
Not surprisingly, we find a significant positive impact of income (measured at the household 
level) on expectations. Those who are richer today are significantly more optimistic about 
their future.  
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Table 2.11. Ordered Probit estimates of the expected change (in 2002) on financial 
situation 
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Head: Female  0.176  0.091  0.078  -0.047 
  (1.28)  (0.65)  (0.55)  (0.32) 
Head: Age  -0.042***  -0.046***  -0.046***  -0.046*** 
  (2.59)  (2.85)  (2.86)  (2.70) 
Head: Age² (/100)  0.046***  0.049***  0.049***  0.044*** 
  (2.92)  (3.12)  (3.13)  (2.68) 
Nb of persons in the household  0.000  0.004  0.004  0.032* 
  (0.02)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (1.65) 
Head: Married  -0.057  -0.039  -0.036  0.018 
  (1.27)  (0.87)  (0.78)  (0.38) 
Head: Years of education  0.097***  0.094***  0.094***  0.124*** 
  (3.40)  (3.29)  (3.26)  (4.14) 
Head: Years of education² (/100)  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.006*** 
  (2.38)  (2.21)  (2.18)  (3.61) 
Head: Non-farm work   0.162*  0.176**  0.177**  0.001 
  (1.92)  (2.09)  (2.10)  (0.01) 
Head: Farm work  0.125  0.125  0.126  0.030 
  (1.41)  (1.40)  (1.41)  (0.32) 
Head: Self-employed  0.457***  0.491***  0.492***  0.246** 
  (3.92)  (4.19)  (4.20)  (1.99) 
Monthly household income (ln)  0.160***  0.163***  0.163***  0.093*** 
  (7.22)  (7.32)  (7.32)  (4.00) 
Receipt of remittances    0.316***     
    (4.30)     
Annual amount of remittances (ln)      0.030***  0.017** 
      (4.68)  (2.57) 
Muslim  0.177**  0.193***  0.193***  0.179** 
  (2.47)  (2.68)  (2.68)  (2.39) 
Urban  -0.470***  -0.478***  -0.476***  -0.284*** 
  (5.89)  (5.97)  (5.95)  (3.37) 
Financial situation improved in 
  the last 12 months 
      0.961*** 
      (11.78) 
Financial situation deteriorated in 
  the last 12 months 
      -0.922*** 
      (11.38) 
Number of observations  1434  1434  1434  1434 
Log likelihood  -1421.8  -1412.5  -1410.8  -1223.8 
Source: LSMS Albania 2002. 
Note:  Ordered  Probit  estimates.  Absolute  values  of  t  statistics  are  in  parentheses.  Significance  levels  are 





In columns (2) and (3), we analyze whether remittances influence or not the subjective 
appreciation of households. We introduce in column (2) a dummy variable that is equal to one 
when  the  household  has  received  remittances  during  the  last  year.  Since  we  control  for 
household income in the regression, this means that the variable associated to remittances 
does not pick up a pure income effect. We find that the composition of family resources has 
an  effect  per  se  on  financial  expectations  in Albania.  Having  received  remittances  from 
abroad makes respondents more optimistic about their future situation. In column (3), we 
replace the dummy transfer variable by the annual amount of remittances and find again a 
positive estimate for that covariate, significant at the 1 percent level. 
In column (4), we finally add the subjective answers to realized changes. We introduce 
two dummy variables in the regression, respectively for improved situation and deteriorated 
situation since the last 12 months. We find that past changes strongly matter to understand 
expectations.
66  On  the  one  hand,  those  who  have  experienced  an  improvement  of  their 
financial  situation  since  last  year  expect  an  improved  financial  situation  in  the  next  12 
months. On the other hand, households whose financial situation has deteriorated are quite 
pessimistic  and  report  more  often  that  their  financial  situation  will  be  deteriorated  in  the 
future. The corresponding estimates are substantial, which suggests a strong inertia between 
past changes and expectations for households.
67 A last comment is that including past changes 
in the regression does not affect the positive influence of remittances on expectations. 
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level, we now extend 
this  analysis  using  the  three  waves  (4182  observations,  1394  households).  We  explain 
expectations on financial situation using random effects ordered Probit models. We drop from 
the regressions household income and amount of remittances, this information being available 
only in 2002, and add instead as covariate the self-reported position on income ladder. As 
shown in Table 2.12, we note that the inclusion of random effects does not really affect our 
previous findings based on the 2002 wave.  
As  shown  in  column  (1),  gender  differences  are  again  not  significant.  More  educated 
heads, Muslim respondents and those who live in a rural area are more often optimistic about 
their financial situation in the next 12 months. Also, we again note that households whose 
                                                            
66 We also note that the other estimates in (4) are not really affected when accounting for past changes. 
67 That  those  who  experienced  an  improvement  of  their  situation  are  more  optimistic  about  their  expected 
changes while those who experienced a decrease are pessimistic is perfectly consistent with the results of Das 
and van Soest (1997), who also point out the strong influence on realized changes on expectations.  
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financial situation has improved during the last 12 months are more likely to be optimistic, 
while a deterioration in the last 12 months makes respondents more pessimistic about their 
future. Two differences are nevertheless worth mentioning. First, being married has now a 
negatively significant effect on expectations. It is certainly more difficult for married people 
to migrate, which would worsen expectations. Second, we now find a negative coefficient for 
non-farm workers. 
 
Table 2.12. Ordered Probit estimates of the expected change on financial situation 
(random effects and fixed effects regressions) 
 
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Head: Female  0.095  0.058   
  (1.00)  (0.61)   
Head: Age  -0.030***  -0.032***  -0.289 
  (2.64)  (2.82)  (1.54) 
Head: Age² (/100)  0.024**  0.026**  0.047 
  (2.25)  (2.37)  (0.27) 
Nb of persons in the household  0.020  0.026**  0.062 
  (1.57)  (2.08)  (0.74) 
Head: Married  -0.034  -0.023   
  (1.09)  (0.75)   
Head: Years of education  0.057***  0.055***   
  (2.86)  (2.76)   
Head: Years of education² (/100)  -0.003***  -0.003**   
  (2.71)  (2.52)   
Head: Non-farm work   -0.119**  -0.115**   
  (2.07)  (2.00)   
Head: Farm work  0.011  0.011   
  (0.18)  (0.19)   
Head: Self-employed  -0.101  -0.093   
  (1.44)  (1.33)   
Income ladder (1: poor – 10: rich)  0.187***  0.185***  0.308*** 
  (12.26)  (12.11)  (6.92) 
Receipt of remittances    0.171***  0.205 
    (3.67)  (1.60) 
Muslim  0.099**  0.105**   
  (1.96)  (2.08)   
Urban  -0.222***  -0.216***   
  (4.11)  (4.01)   
Financial situation improved in   the last 
12 months 
0.934***  0.924***  1.167*** 
(16.86)  (16.65)  (9.14) 
Financial situation deteriorated in   the last 
12 months 
-0.883***  -0.878***  -0.903*** 
(16.46)  (16.37)  (7.12) 
Number of observations  4182  4182  4182 
Log likelihood  -3441.1  -3434.4   
Source: LSMS Albania 2002. 
Note:  (1),  (2)  and  (3)  are  random  effects  Ordered  Probit  estimates,  (4)  are  fixed  effect  ordered  estimates. 
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) 
and 10% (*). Regressions (1), (2) and (3) also include a set of threshold parameters. 
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The self-reported position on the income ladder is positively  correlated with financial 
expectations. A difficulty is that this covariate is also a subjective outcome, so that it may be 
contaminated by the optimistic/pessimistic view of the household on future income. However, 
it still remains a good proxy of the household current economic status. In column (2), we 
introduce an additional explanatory variable related to the receipt of remittances. We find that 
respondents have a more optimistic view on their future financial situation when they benefit 
from such private transfers.
68 It thus seems that the composition of household income matters 
when understanding expectations on financial situation. 
We have also attempted to account for fixed effects in the ordered Probit regressions. This 
specification  would  indeed  be  more  appropriate  if  the  individual  unobserved  effects  are 
correlated with the characteristics of the household. As there is no direct approach to estimate 
a fixed effect ordered Probit model, we proceed in the following way. 
First, we estimate a set of conditional Logit models by grouping adjacent outcomes related 
to financial expectations. We define two dependent variables 
j So  such that  1
1 = So  if  2 > S  
and  0
1 = So  otherwise (corresponding to situations remaining the same or improved)  and 
1
2 = So   if  3 > S   and  0
2 = So   otherwise  (improved  situations).  For  each 
j So ,  we  get  a 
consistent  estimate 
j b   of  b   using  the  conditional  Logit  estimator  (Chamberlain,  1980). 
Secondly, we rely on a Classical Minimum Distance estimator to get a restricted estimator for 
b   from 
1 b   and 
2 b .  Specifically,  we  solve  ( ) ( ) b J b J d H V H - -
- ˆ ˆ ' ˆ min
1 ,  where  V ˆ   is  a 
weighting  positive  definite  matrix  and  J   is  the  unrestricted  vector  )' ' , ' (
2 1 b b J = .  The 
mapping from J  to  b  is linear, with  b J H = . The solution  b ˆ  is  ( ) ( ) J b ˆ ˆ ' ˆ ' ˆ 1 1 1 - - - = V H H V H  
and the corresponding asymptotic covariance matrix is given by  ( ) ( )
1 1 ˆ ' ˆ
- - = H V H V b . 
Results of the fixed effects model are in column (3) of Table 5. By definition, all the 
covariates that are time invariant at the individual level (like gender, education, religion, etc.) 
are excluded from the regression.
69 With respect to the random effects specification, age and 
number of persons in the household are no longer significant. Changes in situation over the 
last 12 months strongly influence expectations. Respondents are more optimistic when their 
financial situation has improved in the past, while they are more pessimistic about the future 
                                                            
68 The significantly positive effect of remittances still holds (and it is in fact slightly larger) when excluding the 
self-reported position on income ladder from the regression. 
69 We also choose to exclude the occupational dummies because of limited variation over time.  
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when they have already experienced negative shocks. Expectations are an increasing function 
of the position on income ladder. Finally, we obtain a positive value associated to the receipt 
of remittances. However, the coefficient is now significant only at the 11 percent level. 
A question worth is to know whether the dummy associated to the receipt of transfers can 
really  be  considered  as  exogenous.  Endogeneity  may  stem  from  measurement  errors, 
simultaneity, or omitted variables (unobserved heterogeneity). Clearly, as shown by the data, 
it remains difficult to measure private transfers since their magnitude strongly depends on the 
questions asked in the survey.  Nevertheless, measurement  errors are certainly not a more 
important problem for remittances than for other variables, including perceptions about the 
future financial situation. Concerning simultaneity, it seems hard to believe that expectations 
would increase remittances, while remittances are on a priori grounds an additional source of 
resources that is likely to improve expectations. Finally, the omitted variables bias is removed 
since we control for unobserved heterogeneity through the inclusion of fixed effects at the 
individual level when turning to the minimum distance estimator.
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2.2.2.5. Understanding differences in realized and expected changes 
The use of longitudinal data with information on both expectations and realized changes 
allows us to know whether households overestimate or underestimate ex ante their future 
income growth. We proceed in the following way. Using the 2002 and 2003 waves, we obtain 
information on income expectations respectively about 2003 and 2004. Then, using the 2003 
and 2004 waves, we can compare these expectations with realized changes over the last 12 
months, respectively between 2002 and 2003 using the 2003 wave and between 2003 and 
2004 using the 2004 wave. Results of the comparison are in Table 2.13. 
According to the LSMS data, 32.9% (31.8+1.1) of the respondents expect an improvement 
(either ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat’) of their financial situation between t and t+1. However, only 
21.2%  (20.3+0.9)  of  them  claim  that  their  realized  situation  has  indeed  improved  (either 
‘somewhat’  or  ‘a  lot’)  during  the  last  12  months.  Clearly,  these  findings  suggest  that 
households tend to substantially overestimate their income changes, meaning that they are too 
optimistic. Interestingly, the proportions of expectations and realizations ‘remaining the same’ 
                                                            
70 A difficulty could stem from a state dependence in the provision of remittances over time. If remittances in t 
depend on transfers made in t-1, then past remittances could influence current expectations. Nevertheless, we 
have only three waves, so that we cannot estimate a dynamic Probit model.  
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are very similar, respectively 54.4% and 57.6%. The difference between the two variables is 
hence linked to deteriorated situations. While only 12.7% of the respondents were expecting a 
deterioration of their situation, 21.3% of households in Albania consider that their situation 
has indeed deteriorated since last 12 months. 
 
Table 2.13. Comparison between realized and expected changes in financial situation 
Self-assessed change since 
last 12 months 
(between t and t+1) 












Improved a lot  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.9 
Somewhat improved  0.4  10.3  8.2  1.1  0.3  20.3 
Remaining the same  0.4  16.4  34.1  5.1  1.6  57.6 
Somewhat deteriorated  0.0  3.6  8.6  2.0  1.0  15.2 
Deteriorated a lot  0.0  1.1  3.3  1.0  0.8  6.1 
Total  1.1  31.8  54.4  9.1  3.6  100.0 
Source: LSMS Albania 2002-2003-2004. 
 
Whatever  their  initial  expectations,  respondents  most  often  have  the  feeling  that  their 
situation  has  not  changed  over  the  last  12  months. Among  those  who  were  expecting  a 
somewhat  improved  situation,  51.6%  of  them  believe  that  their  situation  has  in  fact  not 
changed (and only 32.4% of them claim that their situation has indeed improved). Among 
those who were expecting a somewhat deteriorated situation, we find that only 22% feel that 
their situation is indeed worse than last year, the situation remaining unchanged for 56% of 
the respondents. It thus appears that more optimistic individuals are in fact too optimistic, 
while more pessimistic individuals are in fact too pessimistic.  
As  suggested  in  Das  and  van  Soest  (1999),  having  information  both  on  realized  and 
expected  changes  for  a  same  period  makes  possible  to  test  the  assumption  of  rational 
expectations. Let 
*
1 / + t t S  be the latent variable associated to expectations on financial situation 
in the next 12 months at date t, and let 
*
/ 1 t t R +  be the latent variable measuring realized changes 
since last 12 months at date t+1. Realized changes may be expressed in the following way, i.e. 




/ 1 , where  t r  are year-specific variables and  t e  is a residual normally 
distributed. Under the assumption of rational expectations, then the linear constraint  1 = d  
should hold. A difficulty to assess the relevance of this restriction is that we never observe the 
latent variables 
*
1 / + t t S  and 
*
/ 1 t t R + .  
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We thus choose to proceed in the following way to get a confidence interval for d . First, 
we express the observed outcomes  1 / + t t S  and  t t R / 1 +  as function of household covariates and 
estimate the corresponding regressions using random effects ordered Probit models
71. Then, 
we compute the linear fitted values of both latent variables for each observation of the sample, 
i.e. 
*
1 / + t t S  and 
*
/ 1 t t R + . As a final step, we estimate 
*
/ 1 t t R +  as a function of 
*
1 / + t t S  and a dummy 
variable for 2003 using OLS, with clustering at the individual level.  
According to the Albanian LSMS data, we find a value of 0.558 for the parameter d , with 
a standard error of 0.026. At the 95 percent level, the corresponding confidence interval is 
[0.507; 0.609], meaning that the constraint  1 = d  is clearly rejected.  Interpretation of this 
result is simply that Albanian households do not have rational expectations. Interestingly, Das 
and van Soest (2003, p. 423, Table 8) reach very similar conclusions in the Netherlands over 
the period 1984-1988. Using a slightly different procedure based on maximum likelihood 
estimation, these authors find a value of 0.54 for the parameter d . 
Finally, we try to understand differences between realizations and predictions related to 
changes in financial situation and investigate the role of individual characteristics on these 
deviations. Let  1 / + t t D  be a measure of these deviations for a given time period, such that 
t t t t t t R S D / 1 1 / 1 / + + + - = .  When  1 / + t t D  is strictly positive, this means that Albanian households 
tend to overestimate their future income, while underestimation of future income holds when 
0 1 / < + t t D . According to the data, this variable takes values ranging from -3 to 3, but large 
underestimations  or  overestimations  of  income  changes  are  not  very  frequent
72.  We  then 
consider only three cases for  1 / + t t D , i.e.  0 1 / < + t t D  (17.9%),  0 1 / = + t t D  (47.3%) and  0 1 / > + t t D  
(34.8%). We rely on ordered Probit models to explain deviations between realizations and 
predictions. 
In column (1) of Table 2.14, we report the estimates from an ordered Probit model using 
changes  in  income  between  2002  and  2003.  While  we  use  a  restricted  sample  of  1430 
observations, this allows us to control for household income in the regression. A striking 
feature is that very few coefficients are significant and the receipt of remittances does not 
                                                            
71 In these regressions, we control for gender, age, number of persons in the household, marital status, education, 
occupation,  receipt  of  remittances,  religion  and  urban/rural  status,  but  we  choose  to  exclude  the  subjective 
income scale (this does not affect our conclusions). The corresponding sample comprises 2773 observations. 
72 For instance, the variable measuring deviations between expectations and realizations is equal to -3 for 0.3% 
of the respondents, -2 for 2.9% of them, +2 for 7.3% of them and +3 for 1.1% of them.  
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influence the dependent variable. In fact, only two sets of covariates have an impact on the 
difference between realizations and expectations. First, Muslim respondents are more likely to 
overestimate their changes in financial situation. Secondly, deviations between realized and 
expected changes depend on past changes. While the deviation tends to be higher with a 
financial situation improved in the last 12 months, the  gap is reduced  when people have 
experienced a deterioration of their financial in the last 12 months.  
In columns (2) and (3), we combine information for the periods 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 
and  we  then  estimate  random  effect  ordered  Probit  models  to  control  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity at the individual level. This has little impact on our previous results. We now 
observed that the squared term associated to years of education is negative (at the 10 percent 
level), while the deviation between expectations and realizations is higher in urban than in 
rural areas. Nevertheless, the most influential variables remain income changes in the past. 
Those  whose  income  has  fallen  have  a  larger  propensity  of  underestimation,  while  those 
whose income has increased have a larger propensity of overestimation.  
Finally,  we  turn  to  a  fixed  effect  ordered  specification  using  the  minimum  distance 
estimator previously described
73. The corresponding estimates are in column (4) of Table 13. 
Two comments are in order. First, we still evidence a strong effect of past changes in income. 
Households  whose  income  has  fallen  are  too  pessimistic,  while  those  whose  income  has 
increased tend to be too optimistic (since they overestimate more often their future financial 
situation). Second, the  difference between  expectations and realizations is now increasing 
with the self-reported position on income ladder and with the receipt of remittances, albeit 
this effect remains hardly significant (at the 5.4 percent level).
74 
An interpretation of our findings is that respondents attach too much importance to their 
past changes in financial situation. For instance, those who have experienced a negative shock 
in income become too pessimistic at the next period, probably because they fear living again 
the  same  bad  experience.  Our  fixed  effects  estimates  also  suggest  that  people  receiving 
transfers from foreign countries tend to overestimate their future financial situation. Several 
explanations may come to mind. First, recipients may anticipate that they will receive more 
                                                            
73  As  we  have  three  values  for  the  dependent  variable  measuring  deviations  between  expectations  and 
realizations, we estimate two conditional Logit models (one for null or positive values for deviation, one for 
strictly positive values) and combine the two set of estimates to form only one vector of coefficients.  
74 We have also estimated the fixed effects model without the self-reported income ladder. In that case, we find a 
coefficient of 0.360 for the receipt of remittances, with a t-value of 2.03.  
84 
 
inflows  at  the  next  period
75.  Secondly,  among  households  involved  in  farming  activities, 
remittances  may  be  viewed  as  a  less  uncertain  form  of  resources  and  make  them  more 
optimistic. Finally, remittances may be invested in other activities. Such investments are of 
course  expected  to  generate  additional  resources,  but  there  also  may  be  some  substantial 
(unexpected) delay before receiving benefits from these investment decisions. 
 
Table 2.14. Estimates of difference between expected and realized changes in financial situation 
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Head: Female  0.015  -0.032  -0.032   
  (0.11)  (0.31)  (0.31)   
Head: Age  -0.008  -0.020  -0.020  0.095 
  (0.49)  (1.62)  (1.62)  (0.26) 
Head: Age² (/100)  0.007  0.015  0.015  -0.130 
  (0.43)  (1.32)  (1.33)  (0.36) 
Nb of persons in the household  0.015  0.004  0.004  -0.132 
  (0.81)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (1.33) 
Head: Married  0.003  0.013  0.014   
  (0.06)  (0.39)  (0.40)   
Head: Years of education  0.025  0.022  0.022   
  (0.86)  (1.03)  (1.03)   
Head: Years of education² (/100)  -0.003  -0.002*  -0.002*   
  (1.61)  (1.86)  (1.87)   
Head: Non-farm work   0.019  -0.098  -0.099   
  (0.23)  (1.56)  (1.57)   
Head: Farm work  0.024  0.029  0.029   
  (0.27)  (0.45)  (0.44)   
Head: Self-employed  0.114  -0.052  -0.055   
  (0.99)  (0.69)  (0.72)   
Monthly household income (ln)  0.002       
  (0.07)       
Income ladder (1: poor – 10: rich)      0.003  0.202*** 
      (0.21)  (3.43) 
Receipt of remittances  -0.010  0.043  0.042  0.343* 
  (0.14)  (0.86)  (0.85)  (1.93) 
Muslim  0.248***  0.233***  0.233***   
  (3.47)  (4.34)  (4.34)   
Urban  0.039  0.121**  0.121**   
  (0.49)  (2.08)  (2.06)   
Financial situation improved in 
  the last 12 months 
0.287***  0.323***  0.318***  1.969*** 
(3.90)  (5.37)  (4.94)  (9.41) 
Financial situation deteriorated in 
  the last 12 months 
-0.379***  -0.321***  -0.318***  -2.359*** 
(4.99)  (5.25)  (5.05)  (8.87) 
Number of observations  1430  2773  2773  2773 
Log likelihood  -1444.5  -2794.1  -2794.1   
Source: LSMS Albania 2002-2003. 
Note: (1) are ordered Probit estimates for 2002, (2) and (3) are random effects Ordered Probit estimates, (4) are 
fixed  effect  ordered  estimates.  Absolute  values  of  t  statistics  are  in  parentheses.  Significance  levels  are 
respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Regressions (1), (2) and (3) also include a set of two 
threshold parameters. 
                                                            
75 This could for instance occur if remittances are a signal of successful  migrations or if  migrants  have to 




While economic theories related to the study of household behavior assign a central role 
to income expectations, empirical evidence on this issue remains rather scarce, especially in 
the context of less developed countries where household income is usually subject to more 
uncertainty. This  contribution  adds  empirical  evidence  on  income  expectations  in Albania 
using subjective information on income changes and panel data over the period 2002-2004, 
with a focus on the role of remittances. Our main conclusions are as follows.  
First, expectations on financial situation in Albania are not only affected by the current 
level  of  income,  but  also  by  past  changes  in  income. A  similar  result  was  found  in  the 
Netherlands by Das and van Soest (1997, 1999). Secondly, the composition of household 
income  matters.  We  find  that  the  receipt  of  remittances  has  a  positive  influence  on  the 
subjective  appreciation  of  households  about  their  future  financial  situation. Thirdly,  when 
comparing realized changes and income expectations over the same time period, we evidence 
that Albanian households do not have rational expectations. Those whose income has fallen in 
the past have a larger propensity of underestimation, while those whose income has increased 
have  a  larger  propensity  of  overestimation.  Finally,  respondents  receiving  transfers  from 
foreign countries tend to slightly overestimate their future financial situation. Nevertheless, it 
should be kept in mind that our fixed effects estimates associated to remittances are hardly 
significant. Undoubtedly, it would be useful to have more detailed information on incomes 
and on transfer amounts
76. 
As they stand, our results have strong macroeconomic implications. From an empirical 
viewpoint, it would be of interest to further analyze the complex interplay between economic 
growth in Albania and the fact that households are on average optimistic about their future 
financial  situation. Also,  the  role  of  remittances  and  their  positive  effects  on  well-being 
deserve further attention. Recipients may for instance be more optimistic about their future 
because migrants will have more skills and abilities when coming back in Albania or because 
remittances  are  invested  in  local  activities  and  will  generate  additional  resources  for  the 
households. All these issues are left for future research. 
                                                            
76 When turning to the longitudinal analysis, we are only able to control for the receipt of transfers as transfer 
amounts are not available in 2003 and 2004. Clearly, receiving large amounts of remittances should have a 
positive effect on expectations about financial situation.  
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